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Abstract 
The analysis of credit risk by banks and rating agencies is very complicated because 
risk events, such as default and bankruptcy, are influenced by multiple factors, 
including those that are individually specific, as well as those arising from the external 
environment. The world economy has been shown to be a complex adaptive system 
(CAS), as companies and individual people within the global economy are constantly 
reacting to influences from the activities of other companies and the people they are 
interconnected with, in addition to external influences. This thesis uses a methodology 
developed for CAS to analyse the characteristics of multiple credit risk events in the 
United States, Europe and Asia between 1990–2010, as well as personal bankruptcies 
in Australia between 2008–2016 to establish the significance of factors driving credit 
risk. The analysis indicates that factors that drive corporate default are significant and 
stable over time in the United States, whilst differences across different economic zones 
are observed, meaning a static credit risk model will not work across different countries. 
The results for personal bankruptcy show that Age, Gross Income, Spouse Income, No 
Real Assets and Major City are five of the major characteristics and they show a stable 
pattern from 2008–2016. Moreover, two macro-economic factors ‘Change in 
Unemployment Rate’ and ‘Change in Interest Rate’ are significant as well. This 
indicates that drivers of bankruptcy come from socioeconomic issues, such as the 
external economic environment, income and the place where you live, rather than 
individual characteristics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Credit risk indicates the potential loss arising from corporations or individuals failing 
to pay their financial obligations. It is one of the major risks in banking, as banks’ 
business models expose them to significant credit risks. The Basel Accord defined 
credit risk as the potential loss of capital if debtors did not pay their obligations. The 
Basel Accord set a framework that recommended capital adequacy so that a bank would 
have enough assets for defaults from their debtors(Bancaria 2004). In financial industry, 
credit default risk does not exist only in loans, but also in various of financial products 
such as bonds, securities and derivatives. Rating companies like Moody’s assess credit 
default risk based on those products’ issuers instead of each single product(Service 
2007). The most commonly adopted methodology in predicting corporate clients’ 
default and individual bankruptcy is a rating-based approach, where a rating is based 
on assumed drivers of default. The predictive capability of these models is determined 
by the stability of the environment over time, such that it can be assumed that historical 
drivers of default events remain relevant to the future.  
 
However, the environments in which companies operate are a CAS (Evans, Allan & 
Cantle 2017), with their behaviour being influenced by changes from both within and 
outside the system. Credit risk events emerge in this complex economic system, which 
means that they cannot be studied and predicted by simply analysing outcomes of 
individual companies and persons in isolation. It requires a methodology that is able to 
capture the dynamic features of complex economic systems and reflect the evolutionary 
property of risk events. The drivers of credit risk come from both individually specific 
and external environments. The significance of macroeconomic factors in driving credit 
risk events was noted in (De Graeve, Kick & Koetter 2008), where an analysis of the 
interrelationship between bank stability and monetary policy showed that a tightening 
of monetary policy increased the probability of distress in German banks. The external 
influences on companies include technological change (Grossman & Helpman 1993), 



general economic changes, and regulations. The methodology used in this thesis was 
specifically developed to analyse the underlying characteristics of events occurring in 
a CAS, with the objective of establishing the relative significance of factors that 
companies and individuals will be influenced by and that result in a default or 
bankruptcy. 
1.1: Objective of the Study 
Studying the drivers of credit risk is a key issue in the financial industry, especially 
after the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 that was triggered by credit defaults 
(Brunnermeier 2009). Banks and other financial institutions that expose their business 
model to credit risk need to price their risks accurately. Understanding the reason for 
default and bankruptcy is a very important question to address (Bonfim 2009). Further, 
figuring out the underlying drivers of default and bankruptcy events is very helpful in 
predicting risk events and estimating the loss on risks. The drivers of credit risk come 
from both specific events and the external environment. The objective of this thesis is 
to provide a method to understand the characteristics of credit risk events at both the 
corporate and individual level, and to understand whether the characteristics are 
controllable by corporations and people or uncontrollable based on the macroeconomic 
environment.  
1.2: Research Method 
This thesis will combine the study of credit risk management with the concept of a CAS 
and system-based analysis. Subsequently, four sections will be discussed in terms of 
the objective of the thesis: 
1. Review of the literature on credit risk models; 
2. Identification of the economic system in which risk events arise as a CAS; 
3. Adoption of system-based analysis to determine the characteristics of credit risk 
events; 
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4. Validation of the analysis for credit risk events at both the corporate and individual 
level. 
1.3: Organisation of the Study 
Under the assumption that the economic system is a complex adaptive system, credit 
risk events have dynamic features arising from both specific factors related to the debtor 
and environmental factors. To address the research question “what is the significant 
factors that affect risk events such as default and bankruptcy on corporate and 
individual person level”, the structure of thesis is organised as follows: 
 
1. Chapter 2 will introduce the fundamental concept of credit risk and classic risk 
models; 
2. Chapter 3 will review the characteristics of CAS and justify the economic system 
as being a typical example of CAS; 
3. Chapter 4 will discuss a system-based method called cladistics analysis, which will 
be used to analyse credit risk events; 
4. Chapter 5 will describe the dataset and its preparation for cladistics analysis; 
5. Chapter 6 will apply cladistics analysis to corporate credit default events and 
discuss the results for three economic zones in the US, EU and Asia; 
6. Chapter 7 will show a period analysis of the US market; 
7. Chapter 8 will apply cladistics analysis to individual bankruptcies in Australia;  
8. Chapter 9 will discuss the results of the power law test for credit risk and tipping 
point analysis; 
9. Chapter 10 will draw the conclusion and implications of the current study and then 
discuss the future research area. 
 
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Chapter 2: Credit Risk and Credit Risk Management 
2.1: Introduction 
Credit risk, or counterparty risk, is the possible risk that borrowers may fail to pay their 
financial obligations as agreed. It is a very primary and important risk in finance, 
especially in the banking industry (Van Gestel & Baesens 2009). Essentially, banks’ 
basic business model is to raise money from retail depositors and the interbank market 
and then lend these deposits to different types of companies, firms and individuals (Van 
Greuning & Brajovic-Bratanovic 2009). It is inevitable that some of the borrowers will 
fail to repay the capital or interest on time and cause a loss to the bank. A large number 
of defaults could very severely impact the financial industry and the whole economic 
system, which is what occurred in 2008 (Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010). Accordingly, 
the Basel II Capital Accord built new standards and guidance for credit risk 
management in the banking industry and ensured that there is adequate capital for such 
risks (Kashyap & Stein 2004). This chapter will introduce credit risk and credit risk 
management models based on the current literature. 
This chapter consists of the following: 
1. Section 2.2 provides a basic concept of risk and risk sources in banks; 
2. Section 2.3 defines credit default risk and outlines key components in its 
measurement; 
3. Section 2.4 outlines the major categories of credit risk models; 
4. Section 2.5 discusses the determinants of credit default being applied to 
models; 
5. Section 2.6 provides a critique of credit default models.  
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2.2: Risk and Risk Sources 
2.2.1: Risk 
Essentially, risk can be viewed as the uncertainty of outcomes and the potential loss 
that may occur in the future (Kaplan & Garrick 1981). Every company, firm and 
financial institution has various risks in their business. As such, risk management does 
not mean avoiding all risks but to accept reasonable risk exposure and maintain a 
business properly (Van Gestel & Baesens 2009). Banks play a key role in helping 
various companies raise capital and in turn, support the growth of industry. However, 
in doing so, banks run the risk that borrowers may not pay their financial obligation on 
time, which in turn, given the central position of banks in the economy, may affect the 
economic system as well (Van Gestel & Baesens 2009).  
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2.2.2: Risk Source 
Based on the Basel II Capital Accord, banks normally have three main sources of risk: 
credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
Figure 2.1: Main Sources of Risk in Banks 

2.2.3: Market Risk 
In order to manage market risk, banks normally take positions in different types of 
capital market securities. The underlying source of market risk involves equity price, 
interest rates, currency, and commodity price. 
There are several sub-risks of market risks (Fraser & Simkins 2010), including: 
1. Currency risk: The risk that changes in exchange rates that have an impact 
on the expected cash flows of an entity. Currency risk can have a direct 
effect, such as when the realised cash flows in the home currency differ from 
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expectations, or indirectly, when expected sales are impacted due to 
competitive price changes related to exchange rates. 
2. Interest rate risk: The risk that changes in interest rates that have an impact 
on the expected cash flows of an entity. 
3. Commodity price risk: The risk that changes in commodity prices that have 
an impact on the expected cash flows of an entity. 
4. Equity price risk: The risk that changes in equity prices that have an impact 
on the expected cash flows or operating strategies of an entity. 
5. Economic risk: The risk that changes in various economic variables, such as 
GDP growth, housing starts, or consumer confidence, that have an impact 
on expected cash flows or operating strategies of an entity. 
6. Liquidity risk: The risk that changes in market liquidity dramatically 
impacts the ability of an organisation to facilitate trades or trading strategies 
in an efficient manner and at reasonable costs due to shifts in market trading 
activity.  
2.2.4: Operational Risk 
Another major source of risk is operational risk. Generally, operational risk is the risk 
that firms and institutions may fail to deliver their objectives due to inefficient and 
failed decisions or implementation (Fraser & Simkins 2010). For instance, there are 
thousands of decisions, transactions, and executions made by banks every day. 
Operational risk in banks can also be described as the direct or indirect loss resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external 
events (Bancaria 2004). Specifically, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2004) defined seven types of operational risk events, such as: 
1. Internal fraud: Acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or 
circumvent regulations, the law or company policy, excluding 
diversity/discrimination events, which involves at least one internal party.  
2. External fraud: Acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or 
circumvent the law, by a third party.  
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3. Employment practices and workplace safety: Acts inconsistent with employment, 
health or safety laws or agreements, from payment of personal injury claims, or 
from diversity/discrimination events.  
4. Clients, products and business practices: Unintentional or negligent failure to meet 
a professional obligation to specific clients (including fiduciary and suitability 
requirements), or from the nature or design of a product.  
5. Damage to physical assets: Loss or damage to physical assets from natural disasters 
or other events.  
6. Business disruption and system failures: Disruption of business or system failures.  
7. Execution, delivery and process management: Failed transaction processing or 
process management, from relations with trade counterparties and vendors.  
2.3: Credit Risk 
2.3.1: Overview of Credit Risk  
Credit risk is another major risk for banks and is closer to market risk than operational 
risk in that credit risk and market risk are deliberately taken on by a bank, whereas 
operational risk is incurred from just being in the banking business. Market risk and 
credit risk have many common drivers evolving from the capital market, and a variation 
of those markets can lead to loss directly for many companies and increase the default 
rate in credit risk (Jarrow & Turnbull 2000). Moreover, a small number of severe 
defaults could cause a large loss for the bank (Bessis 2011), which makes credit risk 
one of the major risks in the banking industry.  
 
The capital adequacy ratio is a core concept in the banking industry, as it is a measure 
of a bank’s capital in regard to its exposed risks. Regulators assess banks’ capital ratio 
to make sure that banks can bear a reasonable level of losses before insolvency (Moyer 
1990). Therefore, strengthening the capital ratio has been one of the highest priority 
tasks, especially after the financial crisis in 2008 (Le Leslé & Avramova 2012). 
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The Basel Accord has been developing for decades to provide recommendations on 
banks’ risk management for both regulators and banks. In 1998, the Basel I Accord 
offered a method of credit risk assessment in banks for four types of credit risks: 
sovereigns, banks, mortgages and corporates. The Basel II Accord improved risk 
assessment by using internal rating models to determinate capital requirements for 
different types of risks. In Basel III, risk weights on the exposure of risks were applied 
for the same purpose (Das & Sy 2012). Basel III introduced the concept of a RWA 
(Risk Weighted Asset) as a method of calculating asset value in banking when assessing 
the Capital Adequacy Ratio. It is believed to be a better way to measure the bank’s 
Capital Adequacy Ratio than before, and Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) point out that 
using RWA for banks’ capital composition has three positive functions: 
i. Providing a common measure for a bank’s risks;  
ii. Ensuring that capital allocated to assets is commensurate with risks;  
iii. Potentially highlighting where destabilizing asset class bubbles are 
arising.  
 
Moreover, it illustrates banks’ exposure to different risks clearly. Figure 2.2 below 
shows the RWA for the global banking sector in 2010 and indicates loans to corporate 
and retail clients account for most of the RWA, which makes credit risk the most 
significant risk. 
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Figure 2.2: RWA in Global Banking Sector from Bloomberg 

2.3.2: Credit Risk Measurement 
Measurement of credit risk is a comprehensive task because it involves many 
quantitative and qualitative models and expert opinions (Fraser & Simkins 2010). 
Credit risk analysis is divided into three parts: the probability of default (PD), the Loss 
Given Default (LGD), and the risk exposure (RE), where LGD is also known as ‘1-
Recovery Rate (RR).’  
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Figure 2.3: Components of Credit Risk Management 

Of the three components, PD and LGD are the two most commonly modelled (Fraser 
& Simkins 2010). 
 
• Probability of Default (PD) 
Credit risk is the probability that a default event will happen in the future and cause a 
loss to the lender. The probability of the loss event occurring is called the probability 
of default (PD). The definition of default is not unique; with banks, rating companies, 
such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s, having their own definitions, but typically, if 
payment is not received three months after the due date, it is regarded as being in default. 
Moody’s defines default as three types of events1: 
§ When a missed or delayed payment of interest and/or principal occurs, including 
delayed payments made within a grace period;  
§ When bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks 
(perhaps by regulators) result in failure to meet the timely payment of interest 
and/or principal; or  
§ When a distressed exchange occurs and the issuer offers debt holders a new 
 
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security or package of securities that amounts to a diminished financial 
obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or 
principal amount, lower seniority, or longer maturity); or where the exchange 
had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower to avoid default.  
There are many factors that determine a default. For instance, a company with weak 
revenue or high leverage debt is more likely to default than others (Dhaliwal, Lee & 
Fargher 1991). In addition to those financial factors, some other qualitative factors, 
such as a company’s age, size and exposure to subsidiaries’ activities, also effect the 
probability of a default event in the future (Altman, Sabato & Wilson 2008). External 
factors, such as industry and the economy, are two major drivers of the default rate 
(Caselli, Gatti & Querci 2008). For individuals PD will focus on factors such as income, 
age, and family situation (Peter & Peter 2006). 
 
• Loss Given Default (LGD)  
LGD is the amount of the loss once the borrower has defaulted. In some literature, the 
recovery rate (RR) is used instead of LGD, and the RR is simply the amount of the 
maximum possible loss recovered. In some cases, a company can recover from trouble 
and repay its debt and interest eventually, which means the RR can be high. However, 
in some other cases, loss is not avoidable, and all related parties have to carry the loss 
based on the agreement. There are large variations in the LGD or RR in some cases, 
and they are dependent on the reason for the default and resolutions available (Van 
Gestel & Baesens 2009). 
 
• Risk Exposure (RE) 
RE is defined as the maximum loss when the default occurs. It may not be precisely 
estimated as an exact amount because it depends on the sources of recovery available 
to the lender. In practice, banks will grant obligators a credit limit to control exposure 
to each of them (Bluhm, Overbeck & Wagner 2016).   
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2.4: Credit Risk Modelling  
2.4.1: Credit Risk Models for Corporate’s Default 
Credit risk modelling for corporations is essentially about the probability that a default 
will happen and the consequent loss after the default. A common way to measure and 
manage credit risk is to collect historical data as the basis to predict levels of default 
with different probabilities. Inside banks, many internal rating models have been 
developed to evaluate their risks and estimate reasonable economic capital to support 
possible losses (Lopez & Saidenberg 2000). Thus, numerous credit models related to 
PD and LGD were developed over the past thirty years. Most of these models can be 
sorted into three categories: those based on financial structure, those based on cash 
flows, and those based on market information (Van Gestel & Baesens 2009). 
Figure 2.4: Classification of Default Rating Models 

Intuitively, a firm’s default is affected by its internal financial situation. Internal 
variables such as debt level, profit growth, and cash flow can have a significant impact 
on a firm’s default probability. Under the ‘internal’ assumption, this group of models 
uses a company’s financial structure data to simulate the variation of the firm’s asset 
value in the future and then estimates the default probability by comparing the asset 
values to the company’s debt level. The typical models under this theoretical framework 
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include Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976). Thereafter, the framework was 
extended by Geske (1977), Mason and Bhattacharya (1981), as well as Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995). Unlike the structure model, which takes internal factors into account, 
the market implied models, such as the reduced-form model, uses external factors. They 
assume a firm’s default time and LGD is a statistical process with data from the real 
capital markets. Various famous models in this category include Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1995), and then later, Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997). It was further extended by 
Lando (1998) and Duffie and Huang (1996), with a more precise estimating process.  
 
The Merton and Jarrow models are constructed as follows:  
• Merton Model 
Merton’s model was based on Merton (1974) and Black Scholes’s theory on option 
pricing. One primary assumption of the Merton model is that a firm’s default is caused 
by the variation of the firm’s assets so that it falls below the firm’s debt. Thus, the firm’s 
asset value is defined to follow a diffusion process: 
!"#
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Where +# is a standard Brownian motion, 
σ is instantaneous volatility of the firm’s value return, 
µ is instantaneous expected return on asset, and 
δ is total dividend or coupon payout to shareholder 
Additionally, the firm’s liabilities are mapped to a zero-coupon bond that is maturing 
at time (T). At the time of maturity (T), if the asset value is greater than the debt value, 
then the debt will be paid off and any remainder is income for shareholders. However, 
if the asset value is smaller at time (T) than the debt, the company is in default, and debt 
holders have the right to liquidate the company. In this model, the debt is priced in 
terms of the firm’s market value and its volatility. 
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Figure 2.5: Asset Value VS Time 

The process is illustrated in Figure 2.5 (Van Gestel and Baesens (2009), where /0 and 
/1 are the firm’s asset value at time 0 and T, the assumed maturity date for a zero-
coupon bond that is estimated as equivalent to the firm’s debt. Moreover, it is assumed 
that the firm’s asset value follows a stochastic Brownian motion process during the 
period 0 to T. The firm will default if the firm’s asset value is smaller than the face 
value of the zero-coupon bond at time T, i.e.,	(/1 < 51). In Figure 2.5, the solid line 
represents the case in which the company does not default, as its asset level stays above 
line F. The dashed line indicates a default because the firm’s asset value falls below the 
debt level F at time T. The right-hand side shows the default frequency distribution 
based on the asset value distribution shown on the left-hand side. The default 
probability is simply calculated by taking the area of the shaded surface in the graph. 
 
• Jarrow Model 
The reduced-form model assumes a firm’s default is a statistical process rather than 
based on the firm’s financial structure. The Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) default process 
is assumed to follow the Poisson process: 
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The equation indicates that the probability of a firm’s default can be expressed as a 
function of a constant	λ, and K represents the default time. However, the equation is 
not concerned with the firm’s asset value and debt value. Subsequently, the reduced 
form models were extended, with a Markov process introduced to model the movement 
of the credit rating transition (Jarrow et al. 1997). Further, a Cox process is employed 
to model the default correlation between different companies (Lando 1998). 
 
In summary, the initial credit risk models have limited application in the real fixed-
income market because the models’ underlying assumptions did not reflect the real 
situation (Jarrow 2009). For instance, the firm’s asset value is a key element being 
modelled, and it is assumed as observable and being traded continuously, which means 
the firm’s asset can be traded in the market instantly when a default happens. This is 
unlikely for almost all businesses. According to the explanation in Jarrow (2009)  a 
firm’s assets cannot be traded directly nor indirectly in practice, as a firm has many 
assets. These may include accounts receivable and invisible assets (patents), combined 
with its physical facilities, such as a firm’s assets cannot be traded as assumed in the 
model.  
 
Another category of default models was invented by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), with 
the advantage that they removed the unrealistic assumption relating to the firm’s asset 
value by using variables derived from the capital market. However, the numerous 
defaults in 2008 suggest the accuracy of these pricing models is doubtful because they 
fail to take into account the contagion effect of businesses being interrelated. 
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2.4.2: Credit Risk Models for Individual’s Defaults 
Studies and models that investigate defaults at the individual level are normally oriented 
to credit scoring, which means that their objective is to distinguish groups of individual 
people with “good” and “bad” credit (DeVaney & Lytton 1995). In the current literature, 
some research focusses on assessing mortgage defaults, whilst others look into credit 
card and non-securitised debt defaults. Although there are several different reasons for 
defaults at the individual level, the variables used in the models are very common. Most 
of them are financial because they reflect a person’s ability to pay their financial 
obligations. For instance, Campbell and Dietrich (1983), Vandell and Thibodeau (1985), 
Lawrence, Smith and Rhoades (1992), Mills (1994), and Deng, Quigley, Van Order and 
Mac (1996) all suggest that the LTV ratio (the ratio between debt amount and property 
value) is an important variable that determinates the default of a personal mortgage. On 
the other hand, Stansell and Millar (1976), Vandell (1978), and Ingram and Frazier 
(1982) also suggest that DSR (ratio between income and debt amount) is another 
significant explanatory variable of this type of default. One of most commonly used 
technique to analyse credit defaults is logistics regression. Logit regression models the 
relationship between the probability of bankruptcy and personal financial situations 
such as the study in (Stavins 2001) and (Han & Li 2011). Besides those financial figures, 
personal characteristics are also considered as the variables of determining default, such 
as education, gender, and income (Alfaro & Gallardo 2012).  
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2.5: Discussion of Credit Risk Modelling and Determinants of Credit 
Default  
2.5.1: Corporates Credit Risk Models with Micro and Macro Variables 
In both academic research and the industry, credit risk models at the corporate level 
attempt to connect default events with multiple variables, such as the accounting ratio, 
payment behaviours and macroeconomic conditions (Carling, Jacobson, Lindé & 
Roszbach 2007). Further, those variables can be categorised into micro and macro ones, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.6. 

Figure 2.6: Variables in Credit Risk Models 

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As shown in Figure 2.6, there are two perspectives from which to assess credit risk 
models in the literature (Ahmad & Ariff 2007). One of them is using micro-variables 
as key factors to model credit default, such as focussing on a firm’s asset quality, 
operations and cost efficiency, as claimed by Hassan (1993) and Berger and DeYoung 
(1997). Another perspective is to regard macro-variables as key determinants of credit 
risk. For instance, these include variables derived from the business cycle (Boss, Fenz, 
Pann, Puhr, Schneider & Ubl 2009) and variables derived from the macroeconomy 
(Castro 2013). Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) provided a summary of recent literature related 
to determining drivers of credit default events. All of the analysis cited by Chaibi and 
Ftiti (2015) can be considered as based on a version of multifactor analysis. However, 
it needs to be noted that the papers cited by Chaibi and Ftiti (2015) use data from 
different countries and are tested on different drivers. Table 2.1 summarises the data 
and drivers determined to be relevant to the credit default events analysed. 
Table 2.1: Analysis of Corporate Credit Default 
Paper Countries Drivers  
Ahmad and Ariff 
(2007) 
Australia, France, 
Japan, US, India, 
Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Thailand 
Management efficiency; loan-loss provision; loan to 
deposit ratio; leverage; regulatory capital; funding 
costs; liquidity; spread; total assets 
Podpiera and 
Weill (2008) 
Czechoslovakia Cost efficiency 
Ali and Daly 
(2010) 
Australia, US GDP; interest rates; industrial production; debt to 
GDP ratio 
Zribi and 
Boujelbegrave 
(2011) 
Tunisia Profitability ratio; capital ratio; ownership structure; 
regulation; inflation; GDP growth rate; interest rate; 
exchange rate; bank size 
Castro (2013) Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy 
Unemployment; GDR growth rate; interest rate; 
credit growth; cumulative return on shares, house 
price index; exchange rate; inflation; financial crisis 
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2.5.2: Individual Credit Risk Models with Micro and Macro Variables 
Similarly, credit risk models at the individual level can be categorised as using micro 
or macro variables. “Micro” indicates factors related to individual characteristics, while 
“macro” focuses on those from the macroeconomy. The table below summarises recent 
papers that analysed micro- and macro-variables. 
Table 2.2: Macro-Variable Analysis of Individual Credit Default  
Paper Countries Drivers  
Rinaldi et al. 
(2006) 
Belgium, France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain 
Household debt; disposable 
income; ratio of household gross 
financial assets to disposable 
income; real lending interest 
rate; unemployment rate; 
inflation rate 
Louzis et al. 
(2012) 
Greece GDP growth; unemployment 
rate; lending rates; return on 
equity; solvency ratio; 
inefficiency; size; non-interest 
income; leverage ratio; 
ownership concentration 
Castro (2013) Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy Unemployment; GDR growth 
rate; interest rate; credit growth; 
cumulative return on shares, 
house price index; exchange rate; 
inflation; financial crisis 
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Table 2.3: Micro-Variable Analysis of Individual Credit Default  
Paper Countries Drivers  
Rebelo and Caldas 
(2010) 
Portugal Delay in payments, age, marital 
status, occupation, education, 
location, dependents, income, 
number of bank loans, ratio of 
repayments to income, loan to 
value ratio 
Peter and Peter 
(2006) 
Australia Income, age, employment status, 
government assistance, loan to 
value, marital status, dependents, 
occupation, affordability 
indicator, migrant status, 
location  
Alfaro and 
Gallardo (2012) 
Chile Gender, marital status, age, age 
squared, high school/college 
education, bank account, total 
income, debt to savings ratio, 
loan to value ratio 
Ali, Anderson, 
O'Brien and 
Ramsay (2016) 
Australia Age, gender, marital status, 
dependents, previous 
bankruptcy, location, income, 
occupation 
2.5.3: Critique of Credit Risk Models 
At the corporate level, it is obvious that credit risk is a complex subject because default 
determinants include both micro and macro factors that may be interdependent. Some 
literature has included both micro and macro factors to assess credit risk. For instance, 
Figlewski, Frydman and Liang (2012) brought in additional macroeconomic variables 
to existing credit rating models. Their paper points out that there is a strong relationship 
between macro-factors and micro-factors. Without capturing those dependencies, 
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models will not perform well, especially when liquidity freezes (Jarrow 2009). With 
solid evidence from the crisis in 2008, Jarrow (2009) claimed that models prior to the 
crisis were just too simple, and he argued that:  
 
“These models are static in nature and they do not capture the dynamic 
structure of credit risk. Furthermore, estimation of the model’s inputs 
(prior to crisis) were based on a sample history with an expanding and 
healthy economy, where few defaults occurred. This sample estimation 
bias caused the industry to underestimate default risk for both subprime 
borrowers and financial institutions. Because capital adequacy ratios were 
also based on these simple models, they too were severely underestimated. 
The industry’s underestimation of credit risk was a significant cause of the 
financial crisis.”  
 
At the individual level, most studies of defaults use some type of multifactor or logit 
regression to establish which drivers could be related to credit defaults. It needs to be 
recognised that regression analysis simply creates weights for each characteristic such 
that in aggregate, the resulting equation gives results that are acceptably close to the 
observed outcomes. Thus, it does not necessarily identify the drivers of credit default 
for any individual, i.e., it is an aggregate model that can only be reliably applied to a 
large number of credit defaults and not towards individual cases. 
 
Furthermore, default does not happen individually but in clusters, especially within the 
same industry during recession time (Reinhart & Rogoff 2009). The financial crisis in 
2008 started from a small event in the financial sector, and its effect spread to other 
sectors very quickly, leading to a large number of companies eventually defaulting 
(Carvalho, Ferreira & Matos 2015). Companies and individuals are connected through 
financial networks, and consequently a study of single defaults in isolation in a CAS 
will not assist a meaningful understanding of defaults resulting from multiple reasons. 
Models that only focus on individual entity’s financial situation is not useful credit risk 
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assessment. Additionally, factors that drive default events are evolving with the 
economic environment in CAS. This means static linear-based models like logistics 
regression are not able to explain the dynamic evolvement on factors of default. In the 
following sections, the environment in which defaults occur will be justified as a 
complex system, the behaviour that results in default events in CAS will be explained 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will introduce a methodology that is appropriate to analyse 
dynamic events like default happening inside a CAS. Chapters 5-8 will demonstrate 
how the methodology is used to analysis credit risk events at both corporate and 
individual level. 
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Chapter 3: Complexity and Complex Systems 
3.1: Introduction 
Complexity refers to a system with many entities having interactions and 
interconnectedness (Holland 2014). It is widely observed in the real world where, for 
instance, species interact with each other in the forest (Gomez-Pompa, Vazquez-Yanes 
& Guevara 1972), neurons interact with each other in the brain and cells in the immune 
system (Haken & Jumarie 2006). Similarly, for people, firms and other market 
participants in the economic system also interact (Arthur, Durlauf & Lane 1997). 
Holland (2014) took the rainforest as an example to describe complexity and complex 
systems. The rainforest is made up of endless species, including animals, insects, and 
plants. Endless interactions happen between these species, and there is no single rule 
that can reflect these interactions. It is impossible to precisely predict complex 
phenomenon, such as cooperation between species, migration, co-living and co-
evolution. These complex phenomenon arise from the large number of interactions 
inside a complex system, along with various behaviours (Holland 2014). To study a 
complex phenomenon, it is crucial to understand the system, identify system 
components and study their ways of interaction.   
This chapter will discuss complexity in the economic system.  
1. Section 3.2 describes a CAS and its underlying characteristics. 
2. Section 3.3 justifies the economic system is a CAS.   
3.2: Complex Adaptive System (CAS) and Its Characteristics 
System agents refer to the components that interact with each other inside a complex 
system. CAS’s normally have a hierarchical organisation and are made up of different 
kinds of agents at different levels. Specifically, each single agent interacts with several 
other agents while following multiple simple rules. Further, these simple rules also act 
to gather a group of agents together.  


There is no rigorous definition of a CAS. In the literature, descriptions of CAS are 
usually built around the behaviour of the system and the agents’ interactions. The study 
of CAS is a study of how complicated structures and patterns of interaction can arise 
from disorder through simple but powerful rules that guide change. The essential 
elements are:  
• Sustained diversity and individuality of components  
• Localized interactions among those components  
• An autonomous process that selects from among those components 
based on the results of local interactions, a subset for replication or 
enhancement. (Levin 1998) 
 
Instead of pursuing a definition of various complex systems, academia explores 
common characteristics of these systems. It is suggested by Nicolis and Prigogine (1989) 
that the study of a complex system’s features will reveal several common characteristics 
across different types of systems, which helps us to get a deeper understanding of CAS. 
3.2.1: Interaction 
Interaction is a key concept in a complex system. The complexity of a system emerges 
from a large number of interactions(Mitleton-Kelly, E 2003). In a complex system, 
interactions happen between system agents and also between sub-systems.  
 
“In hierarchic systems, we can distinguish between interactions among 
subsystems ... and the interactions within subsystems.... The interactions 
at different levels may be, and often will be, of different orders of 
magnitude” (Simon 1996). 
 
There are multiple features of interactions that are observed. Firstly, system agents are 
connected with each other, and any single agent both influences and is being influenced 
by several other agents. Influence between agents does not have to be physical, but they 
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can be energy, heat and other forms of information (Cilliers 1998). Secondly, 
interactions are non-linear, which means the magnitude of the connection and 
interdependence between agents is different. Even the transfer of the same information 
from one agent to other related agents could have a very different impact for receiving 
agents. Mitleton-Kelly, E (2003) argues that interactions between strong interdependent 
agents can have a much wider influence at the system level. It is possible that a small 
perturbation will evolve into a so-called ripple effect between several related groups 
and extend to a wide area.  
3.2.2: Self-Organisation and Emergence 
Serugendo, Foukia, Hassas, Karageorgos, Mostéfaoui, Rana, Ulieru, Valckenaers and 
Van Aart (2003) describe self-organisation in a complex system as ‘the fact that a 
system’s structure or organization appears without explicit control or constraints from 
outside the system.’ In other words, complex systems organise themselves 
spontaneously without any leader’s control. Cilliers (1998) points out that self-
organisation is a significant property of complex systems, and it is a way to change a 
system’s internal structure spontaneously to a new order based on an impulse from the 
environment.  
 
Although there might be various ways of self-organising across different types of 
complex systems, they still share several common features. (Cilliers 1998) observed the 
following: 
1. The structure of a complex system is not the outcome of any central control, 
but the outcome of interactions between the system and its external 
environment. 
2. Self-organisation is a non-linear process. It involves numerous local 
interactions between system agents and the effect at the system level. It 
determines that outcome of self-organisation cannot be simply modelled by 
the linear-based model. 
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3. Self-organisation has ‘memory.’ Thus, a complex system can remember its 
historical state; in other words, relatively stable interactions and connections. 
Once an impact from the environment works on the system, the system is 
able to organise itself based on its previous experience. 
During the process of self-organisation, the system is very likely to create new 
relationships, new connections and as such, constructs a new structure of the system. 
Such a phenomenon is also called ‘emergence.’ Holland (2014) defines emergence as 
a result of a very powerful organising force that can overcome a variety of changes to 
lower-level components. 
Figure 3.1: Illustration on Self-Organisation and Emergence 

Figure 3.1 illustrates self-organisation and emergence in a complex system. The left 
graph shows an internal process of self-organisation with no central control. Further, it 
does not matter whether there is any influence coming from the external environment. 
The right graph shows both self-organisation and emergence. When an external 
influence works on system agents at the micro-level, the structure of the system will 
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adapt itself through a large number of local interactions, and the system will adapt to 
the environmental changes and create a new equilibrium (De Wolf & Holvoet 2004).   
3.2.3: Co-Evolution 
The concept of co-evolution occurs from there being different groups or sub-systems. 
The connectivity within a CAS is not restricted to individual agents but may also 
involve several sub-systems. (Clauset, Shalizi & Newman 2009); Kauffman (1992) 
offered a broad definition of co-evolution asF a process of coupled, deforming 
landscapes where the adaptive moves of each entity alter the landscapes of its 
neighbours.GCo-evolution may influence both the form of sub-systems and the 
relationship and the interaction between the related systems 
 
• “The way each element influences and is in turn influenced by all 
other related elements in an ecosystem is part of the process of co-
evolution” (Mitleton-Kelly, E 2003). 
• “The evolution of one domain or entity is partially dependent on the 
evolution of other, related domains or entities” (Koza & Lewin 
1998). 
 
Co-evolution is quite often seen in a natural complex system, where co-evolution refers 
to a pair of species whose traits are mutually influenced, such as habits, dietary 
preference and morphology (Janzen 1980). Co-evolution has been observed in many 
other complex systems. For instance, industrial structures co-evolve with technology 
development (Mokyr 1992), and culture co-evolves with human diversity in social 
systems (Durham 1991). 
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3.3: The Economic System as a CAS 
The original concept of complexity of the economic system is from The Wealth of 
Nations, written in 1776 by Adam Smith. He came up with a concept describing an 
underlying driver of the economic system as an ‘invisible hand,’ and this hand was 
controlled by many self-interested agents, not by any single powerful agent (Smith 
1776):   

“Every individual ... neither intends to promote the public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it ... he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention” 
-- Adam Smith 

In terms of understanding the outcomes of the economic system, it is the agents’ 
behaviour that is important because the economic systems themselves are just processes 
for bringing together the buyers and sellers of goods and services. 
The major agents in the economic system include: 
• Commodity extractors who gather raw materials and sell them to 
industrialists who create products; 
• Industrialists who take raw materials and produce goods for consumers; 
• Consumers who acquire goods from industrialists and financial products 
from financial institutions; 
• Financial institutions who predominately facilitate financial cash flows in 
the economies, borrow and lend cash, originate financial risk management 
securities and contracts on behalf of clients, and manage asset portfolios for 
clients; 
• Regulators, who attempt to control the entry and sustainability of agents, as 


well as the behaviour of agents in the markets, primarily to maintain stability 
of the system; and 
• Exchanges that provide facilities for the sale and purchase of securities(Li, 
Allan & Evans 2017). 
The economic system is made up of large quantities of agents, including consumers, 
producers, firm managers, traders and institutions, as well as firms and regulators. 
These system agents connect with each other and construct a huge complex network. 
Every process in this network, including buying, selling, co-operation, and competition, 
are working through connections within the network. Agents will change to optimise 
their perceived position relative to other agents. Similarly, the economic system arises 
from agent’s connections and satisfies the typical characteristics of the CAS that have 
been mentioned before.  
3.3.1: Interactions 
In the economic system, each system agent has its own reactions to events, but they are 
also influenced by the reactions of other agents, such as its competitors and partners. 
Each agent with specific functions (e.g., companies, institutions, regulators) are both 
influencing and being influenced by each other with their businesses, regulations, 
cultures, and legal and moral constraints. The degree of connectivity between agents 
will vary, and connections will change over time, which makes the economic system 
complex and dynamic.  
3.3.2: Self-Organisation and Emergence 
The economic system is self-organising and will change its internal structure to respond 
to changes in factors, such as monetary policy, interest rates, economic growth rates, 
political stability, unexpected natural catastrophes and so on (Cilliers 1998). Foster 
(1997) argues in his paper that ‘the self-organisation approach to complex systems’ 
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behaviour is observed in a system’s historical process and captured by entropy law. He 
continues to use an analogy between biology and the economic system in terms of their 
self-organising properties. In biology, self-organisation is a process of knowledge 
acquisition (Foster 1997): ‘It becomes an endogenous, non-equilibrium process, which 
tends towards niche limits that are themselves historical in the sense that species can 
enter new niches when old ones run out because of the presence of acquired knowledge. 
Species will learn about their environments and pass on this knowledge through social 
structures.’ Similarly, in the economic system, individuals or firms with different 
functions learn from experience and decisions are made by considering both new 
knowledge and historical experience. For instance, companies on both the supply and 
demand sides make decisions according to their own interests. They might enter, exit, 
or stay in the market and the aggregation of those actions and information available will 
be reflected in the price of a goods or service. The competition process affecting the 
price mechanism actually reflects the system’s ability to self-organise at the micro-level 
(Witt 1997). In complex economic systems, emergence is the economic pattern that 
reflects those micro-level behaviours and interactions (Gintis 2006). 
3.3.3: Co-Evolution  
In an economic system, there are many sub-systems that gather a group of individual 
agents for the same purpose or objective. There are many such co-evolving 
relationships within the economic system revealed by recent research. For instance, 
Windrum, Ciarli and Birchenhall (2009) built a supply-demand model based on a co-
evolution relationship and explored its effect on technological succession. Similar co-
evolving relationships are discussed and justified between institutions and technology 
(Boulding 1978), technological paradigm and governance policy (Ward 2003), as well 
as organisations and their environment (Porter 2006). Boyd and Smith (1996) argue 
that financial innovation is a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by 
other real sectors in both growing and poor economic periods. Therefore, co-evolution 
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is a significant characteristic of the economic system, and such a relationship exists 
between various sub-systems inside the economic system. 
 
A summary of co-evolution relationships in the economic social system and literature 
is shown in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1. 
Figure 3.2: Co-Evolution Relationship in Economic System 


Table 3.1: Literature about Co-Evolution inside Economic System 
 Financial 
Sector 
Real 
Sector 
Technology Environment Government 
Policy 
Financial Sector / Boyd and 
Smith 
(1996) 
Saint-Paul 
(1992) 
(Kwok & 
Tadesse 2006) 
Boyd and Smith 
(1996) 
Real Sector / / (Nelson 
2002) 
Lewin and 
Volberda 
(1999); 
McKelvey 
(1982) 
(Nelson 1995) 
Technology / / / Norgaard 
(2006) 
Ward (2003) and 
(Nelson 2002) 
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Environment / / / / Goodstein and 
Polasky (2005) 
Government 
Policy 
/ / / / / 

3.4: Discussion 
This chapter discussed the basic characteristics of a general CAS and then clarified that 
the economic system is a complex system because its behaviours satisfy the major 
characteristics required for a CAS. The characteristics of CAS are widely discussed by 
(Holland 1995), (Arthur 1997), and (Cilliers 1998). There is no rigorous definition of 
CAS. It is generally defined as including numerous interactions, self-organisations, co-
evolutions. The economic system is full of interacting individual components (firms, 
institutions, regulators), and its structure is self-organising under the constraint of 
regulations. Co-evolution happens between sub-systems inside, such as the financial 
sector, real sector, technology, environment, government policy and so on. Therefore, 
the economic system is a typical example of a CAS. Y. Li (2018) discuss the parallels 
of evolution in nature and in financial risks. 
 
Table 3.2: The conceptual parallels between evolution in Nature and in Economic 
System(Y. Li 2018) 
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The emergence of risk events such as credit defaults reflect the complexity of system 
and their analysis needs to be able to capture the influence from the complexity and 
dynamic features of the economic system. It is then feasible to apply a system-based 
methodology to risk events happened in a CAS. 
 
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Chapter 4: Cladistics 
4.1: Introduction  
As shown in Chapter 3, a CAS exhibits unexpected, unpredictable and non-linear 
behaviours. The study of CAS has decades of history, and the rapid development in 
technology and the exponential growth of computing power have stimulated this field 
of research even faster. As such, many methods and approaches are attempting to model 
those key characteristics of CAS. Anderson (1999) provides several typical types of 
approaches to study CAS, including cellular automata, neural networks, genetic 
algorithms and classifier systems. Each type of model has extensive literature and 
applications that aim to explore and gain a deeper understanding of the behaviour of 
CAS. Those models are basically built on a similar underlying assumption that systems 
can adapt and evolve themselves spontaneously, which cannot be fully explained by 
simple rules, while behaviours of the system are the systemic outcome of dynamic 
interactions (Mitleton-Kelly, Eve 2003).  
 
In this thesis, a complex-system-based method called cladistics analysis will be applied 
to study events that have happened in a CAS. It is a method that can classify CAS based 
on qualitative characteristics and organises them by considering the system’s complex 
features, such as non-linear relationships, self-organisation and emergence. The 
underlying principle of cladistics analysis is to summarise characteristics of each event 
arising from the system and then making connections of all events by analysing their 
common characteristics at the system level. In this way, the outcome of cladistics 
analysis can reflect an overview of the connections of all happened events.  
This chapter consists of the following:  
1. Section 4.2, which introduces the biological background of cladistics 
analysis; 
2. Section 4.3, which provides details of cladistics analysis; 
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3. Section 4.4, which provides extensive application of cladistics analysis in 
other fields; 
4. Section 4.5, which provides a summary of this chapter. 
4.2: Biological Background of Cladistics Analysis  
4.2.1: Biological Taxonomy 
Biological taxonomy is a well-developed scientific discipline that defines and names 
groups of biological organisms. Judd, Campbell, Kellogg and Stevens (1999) described 
it as ‘the theory and practice of grouping individuals into species, arranging species into 
larger groups, and giving those groups names, thus producing a classification.’ In 
biology, there are two fundamental ways to construct taxonomy: classification and 
systematisation (Queiroz 1988). The author provided a further explanation on both: 
 
“Classification is the ordering of entities (elements, individuals) into 
classes; a class is a group defined by a property (attribute, character) or 
properties shared by its members. … Systematization is the ordering of 
entities into systems; a system is a more inclusive entity (whole) whose 
existence depends on some natural process through which its elements 
(component parts) are related. Living things, as entities, can be either 
classified or systematized.” 
 
In the current literature about biological taxonomy, there are two major principles of 
classification: phonetic analysis and cladistics (also known as phylogenetic) analysis 
(McCarthy, Ridgway, Leseure & Fieller 2000). By using methods under either principle 
of classification, biologists classify organisms in the natural world.  
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4.2.2: Phenetics and Cladistics  
The classification methods of phenetics and cladistics differentiated themselves in 
terms of whether they consider evolutionary relationships (known as phylogeny in 
biology). Phenetics classify entities based on overall similarities in terms of their 
characteristics. It takes into account just characteristics without taking their 
evolutionary relations (ancestors and descendants) into account and assigns biological 
entities into a stable structure of classes. In contrast, cladistics takes consideration of 
evolutionary relationships (i.e., common ancestors, shared characteristics). Therefore, 
classifications based on the cladistics principle is asserted as very natural and objective 
(McCarthy et al. 2000). Considering that the purpose of this research is to provide 
insights on the characteristics of credit default events and bankruptcies, cladistics 
analysis will be used because it takes into account the facts of risk events that have 
happened and identifies the linkages and relationships between them. 
4.2.3 Cladistics Analysis in Biology 
The usual outcome of cladistics analysis is a treelike diagram (known as cladogram or 
phylogenetic tree), which is a graphic representation of a historical course of speciation 
in biology (Wiley & Lieberman 2011). Taking an example of two phylogenetic trees 
from Wiley and Lieberman (2011)’s book, 
Figure 4.1: Phylogenetic Tree 

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Figure 4.1 shows two phylogenetic trees that explain the biological relationship 
between lampreys, sharks and osteichthyans. Tree (a) is built based on the hypothesis 
of their evolutionary relationship. There is a node called ‘speciation event,’ which 
separates the shark and osteichthyans into different lineages. On the other hand, tree (b) 
is another representation of their relationship. It focusses on what common 
characteristics determine the split of their lineage in biology. According to the 
description in The Origin of Species (Darwin & Beer 1951), species are classified into 
different groups in terms of their characteristics, and as such, the evolutionary path can 
be detected through observing their evolving characteristics. In terms of the implication 
of two representations of the results, Tree (a) investigates an evolutionary path of 
species and Tree (b) studies the classification of species and what underlying 
characteristics they shared to put them into the same group.  
4.3: Detail of Cladistics Analysis  
4.3.1: Cladogram 
A normal cladogram is made up of nodes and branches. The analysis will use the 
representation of tree (b) in Figure 4.1 above, which looks at the characteristics of 
entities. Therefore, in this type of cladogram, each node represents well-defined 
characteristics, with a branch representing a group of entities with shared characteristics. 
There is a general example of a cladogram shown in Figure 4.2, where it shows six 
entities (labelled by number 1–6), which are classified into one cladogram in terms of 
various of characteristics (labelled by letters A–K). For instance, 1 and 2 share common 
characteristics A and B, while 1, 2 and 3 only share one common characteristic A. A 
and F are regarded as first-level characteristics because they are the two most common 
characteristics shared by all six entities and are located at the most left position in a 
cladogram. The most common characteristics that are located at the most left position 
in a cladogram are defined as Level 1 characteristics, while Level 2 and other lower 
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systemic levels are then used to label less common characteristics progressively 
throughout the tree. 
Figure 4.2: Example of a Cladogram with Characteristics and Levels 

4.3.2 Characteristics 
Characteristics are very basic and key elements in cladistics analysis. They need to be 
defined properly because they should be able to distinguish entities and represent their 
inherited relationships. Sneath and Sokal (1973) set out the criteria for different types 
of characteristics included in a cladistics analysis:  
Table 4.1: Criteria for Qualified Characteristics Set 
Criteria Description 
Meaningless Characteristics A characteristic must reflect at least one property 
of an entity. 
Logically Correlated Characteristics If characteristics are in a logical sequence and one 
can lead to the other, they should be excluded. 
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Partial Logically Correlated Characteristics If characteristics are partially dependent, they 
should be adjusted so that the dependency in the 
characteristics is removed. 
Invariant Characteristics A characteristic that can be found in all entities 
and makes no difference to the cladistics analysis. 
However, when considering the computation 
efficiency issue, they should probably be 
removed. 
 
In cladistics analysis, characteristics are coded into binary format: 1 represents 
characteristics that exist within an event/animal and 0 represents the opposite situation. 
Table 4.2: Example of Characteristic Data Format 
 Characteristic A Characteristic B Characteristic C Characteristic D 
Entity 1 1 0 1 0 
Entity 2 1 1 0 0 
Entity 3 0 1 1 0 
4.3.3 Algorithm used in Cladistics Analysis 
Application of cladistics analysis in biology normally has two data types: molecular 
data and morphological data.(Y. Li 2018). Molecular data focus on the information on 
DNA and proteins and picture the possible evolutionary relationship based on the 
information. Morphological data focuses on the form, structure and structural features 
of species and analyses the evolutionary relationship on the observation of species. One 
of major issues in biology is which analysis should be used. Wiens (2000) argued that 
molecular or morphological or combination of those two could be selected analysis if 
there is a reasonable justification. There are three major families of algorithms that can 
be used to form a cladogram: distance-matrix, maximum parsimony (Fitch, Walter M. 
1971; Lake 1987) and maximum likelihood (Felsenstein 1981; Kishino, Miyata & 
Hasegawa 1990). 
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The distance-matrix method constructs a cladogram by calculating the pairwise 
distance between data. In phylogeny, trees are constructed based on the prediction of 
distance of each pair of species and uses the distance as the length from one species to 
another through the tree structure (Felsenstein 1988). In this family of algorithms, the 
most widely used are UPGMA (unweighted recursive pairwise grouping method and 
WPGMA (weighted-pair group method) (Sokal & Michener 1958). Besides these two, 
sometimes several other algorithms are also applied, such as the neighbour-jointing 
method (Saitou & Nei 1987) and minimum evolution (Rzhetsky & Nei 1993). However, 
many people point out that the distance-matrix method cannot handle a large dataset 
task (Li, Pearl & Doss 2000) and the result is a lack of accuracy (Pagel 1999).  
 
The maximum-likelihood method of constructing a cladogram involves calculating the 
likelihood of each possible tree and then picking the most likely one. Felsenstein (1988) 
explained this process as ‘given an evolutionary model and data, the likelihood of a tree 
is the probability of the data based on them. Then the method simply chooses the tree 
which maximizes the likelihood.’ However, such a method is not very popular because 
it cannot handle a large data-set either. They are more likely applied to describe a 
mutation process at a molecular level (Kishino et al. 1990). Thus, in the context of a 
large number of social entities, such as risk events, it is not suitable to use . 
 
The ‘parsimony’ method is probably one of the most popularly used algorithms among 
the three families (Li et al. 2000). It is based on the theory of Occam’s Razor, which 
argues that a phenomenon should be as simple as possible. Parsimony was first 
introduced in Edwards and Sforza (1963) paper, and they described it as ‘a method of 
minimum evolution.’ Camin and Sokal (1965) extended the method and proposed the 
concept of parsimony in their paper. Maximum parsimony in phylogeny is essentially 
describing a method that constructs a phylogenetic tree with the least evolutionary 
changes. The least evolutionary changes are also referred as the ‘most parsimony.’ 
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Specifically, the distance between sequence data with length L D = DE, DG, … , DI  
and J = 	JE, JG, … , JI are defined as:  
!KLL D, J = @ D? ≠ J? 
and given the sequences data A of length L, the corresponding tree T, the ‘Parsimony 
Score’ is expressed as:  
NO P, / = 	min
=
!KLL(D, J)
T,U

Where the minimum is taken over all possible labels λ of the internal nodes of tree T. 
To find the most parsimonious tree, denote the value of the character for node v by c(v), 
and for each sequence data v, 
O J = V(J)
For inner node v with children u, w, 
O J = 	
O D ∩ O X , O(D) ∩ O(X) ≠ ∅
O D ∪ O X , O(D) ∪ O(X) = ∅

If O(D) ∪ O(X) = ∅, the parsimony score will be incremented by 1. By enumerating 
all possible trees, the one with the minimum parsimony score is the most parsimonious 
tree. 
Therefore, there are two steps that need to be taken to pick up the most 
parsimonious tree (Lin, Fang & Thorne 2007): 
1. Calculating the parsimony score for a tree with sequence data available. 
2. Comparing all possible trees and finding the most parsimonious one. 
 
There are two major algorithms used to calculate the parsimony score in Step 1. One is 
proposed by Kluge and Farris (1969), which is viewed as the simplest form, with all 
the data are transformed into an exist-or-not form with binary (1 and 0) coding. This is 
also known as ‘Wagner Parsimony,’ and its criteria allows the state of a characteristic 
to be reversible from both (0 → 1) and 1 → 0(Felsenstein 1983). The other 
algorithm is called ‘Camin-Sokal Parsimony’ (Camin & Sokal 1965), and its 
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assumption does not allow the reversion of the state of a characteristic. In this thesis, 
Camin-Sokal will be applied, as characteristics of risk events do not have reversion 
features. For instance, if a default or bankruptcy occurs with characteristics related to a 
cash flow issue and a weak economy, then these characteristics are the facts for that 
event and will not change in the future. Therefore, they are irreversible between exist-
or-not states, and thus, Camin-Sokal parsimony is more suitable in this research. 
 
After clarifying the state of characteristics, the next step in the algorithm is calculating 
the total number of changes that are required to construct a cladogram. The following 
is an example of comparing evolutionary changes in different cladograms (Kitching 
1998). 
Table 4.3: Binary Input Data 
Entity/Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 1 1 0 0 0 1 
C 1 0 1 1 1 1 
D 1 0 1 0 1 0 

If there is a dataset, such as Table 4.3, to be analysed with cladistics analysis, then the 
process proceeds as follows. There are four entities (A, B, C, D) and six characteristics 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The table shows that A does not have any of the characteristics, and B 
has characteristic ‘1,’ ‘2,’ and ‘3.’ There are three possible cladograms that can be 
constructed, which are shown below. 
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Figure 4.3: Cladogram a 


Figure 4.4: Cladogram b 












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Figure 4.5: Cladogram c 


It can be observed that entity B, C and D share characteristic ‘1’ and all cladograms put 
them into same group. After the characteristics ‘1,’ the results show three different 
structures of branches to satisfy the observation of characteristics. By summarising the 
three different structures,  
• Cladogram (a) needs seven steps to place all characteristics on the tree;  
• Cladogram (b) requires nine steps to place all characteristics on the tree;  
• Cladogram (c) requires eight steps to place all characteristics on the tree. 
Obviously, cladogram (a) takes the least steps to form a tree and therefore, it is the most 
optimal outcome of this group of data in terms of the principle of maximum parsimony.  
4.4 Applications of Cladistics Analysis outside Biology 
In the biological context, cladistics analysis organises organisms’ relationships in terms 
of their related descendants and ancestors. The methodology is also inferenced on ‘the 
inheritance of ancestral characteristics and on the existence of an evolutionary history 
defined by changes in these characteristics’(Li et al. 2000). Kitching (1998) argues in 
his book that cladistics analysis in not limited to just the biological case, and it can be 


applied to organise any comparative data, such as linguistics (Platnick & Cameron 
1977), and culture evolution (Lycett, Collard & McGrew 2007). The underlying 
principal behind this method is to assign a group of entities into classes in terms of their 
common characteristics. Some papers and books can be found that adopt cladistics 
analysis to explore complex relationships within a group of entities across different 
disciplines. For instance, McCarthy and Gillies (2003) applied cladistics to classify 
manufacturing systems and to capture evolving patterns. Allan, Cantle, Godfrey and 
Yin (2012) applied this method to construct an enterprise risk’s evolutionary tree and 
observed emerging risks through this framework. Moreover, it is also used in cultural 
evolution (Watts, Sheehan, Atkinson, Bulbulia & Gray 2016) and language evolution 
(Rexová, Frynta & Zrzavý 2003). In this chapter, two examples will be introduced to 
illustrate the application of cladistics outside biology. 
4.4.1 Manufacturing System 
McCarthy and Gillies (2003) classifies manufacturing systems with cladistics analysis. 
The paper asserts that ‘if organisational diversity and organisational change process are 
generated by evolutionary mechanisms, studies of organisations based on an 
evolutionary approach, such as cladistics, could have potential, as there is natural 
speculation that organisations, like species, can be engineered by understanding the 
evolutionary processes well enough to intervene and produce competitive 
organisational effects.’  
 
Given the principle of cladistics analysis that organises entities by common ancestors, 
the analysis will classify two manufacturing systems in the same group if they share a 
recent and common ancestor. In other words, two manufacturing systems will be placed 
in different groups if they have a more distant ancestor. The interesting part is when the 
author combined all forms of manufacturing systems and formed a ‘kingdom of 
organisations.’ As such, cladistics analysis can help people recognise the evolvement 
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of manufacturing systems and capture the differences between characteristics when a 
new form emerges. 
 
There are three assumptions that need to be made when applying cladistics analysis to 
manufacturing systems: 
1. Manufacturing systems evolve and have ancestors, 
2. Manufacturing speciate,  
3. Manufacturing systems are subject to the theory of natural selection. 
Part of the cladogram is shown in Figure 4.6, and the full graph will be presented in 
Appendix A (McCarthy et al. 2000) 
Figure 4.6: Cladogram of Manufacturing Systems 
 
Table 4.4: Characteristics of Manufacturing Systems 
1 Standardisation of parts  32 Sequential dependency of workers  
2 Assembly time standards  47 Division of labour 
3 Assembly line layout  48 Employees are system tools and simply 
operate m/c's 
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13 Large volume production 50 Parallel processing (in equipment)  
16 Socialisation training 
(master/apprentice learning) 
  
 
Numbers labelled on nodes represent the characteristics of manufacturing systems, 
which are explained in Table 4.4. There are 53 characteristics summarised by the 
authors and presented in Appendix B. Characteristic ‘1’ (‘Standardisation of Parts’) has 
a very special position because it is located to the left among all characteristics in the 
cladogram, which is shared by all investigated systems except for ‘Ancient Craft 
Systems.’ Therefore, the ancient craft system and the other four systems can be 
classified into two separate generations of manufacturing system in terms of whether it 
is processing with a ‘Standardisation of Parts.’  
 
Cladistics analysis is a novel approach that compares other traditional methods of 
complex systems and organisations. The outcome of the analysis provides insights, 
such as capturing evolving patterns on characteristics while organisational change 
happens, and observing the most parsimonious pathway based on different systems or 
organisations (McCarthy et al. 2000). 
4.4.2 Enterprise Risk 
In financial  systems, there are many interactions between market participants, and 
they behave as a CAS (Allan, Yin & Cantle 2010). Risk events happen inside the system, 
which is difficult to address by a static assessment. Allan and Yin (2010) adopted 
cladistics analysis for a set of data that contains records of risk events and their 
characteristics in financial institutions. Full-risk events and their characteristics are 
shown in Appendix C.  
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There are 22 risk events in total, and their names are extracted in Table 4.5 below. Full 
details will be displayed in Appendix C.  
Table 4.5: 22 types of risk events 
1. Liquidity challenge 9. Regulation change 2 17. Long-term planning 
2. Regulation changes 1 10. Succession planning 18. Tech infrastructure 
3. Violation of privacy 
protection 
11. Model complexity 19. Tax rules 
4. Trusted insider technology 
risks 
12. Convergence of products 20. Regulation differences 
5. Business Continuity 13. Regulation change 3 21. Tax management 
6. Technology development  14. Poor decision making 22. Infrastructure  
7. Product 15. Misunderstanding of risks  
8. Geographical 16. HR policies  
 
Examples of characteristics of risk events in Appendix C are also extracted into Table 
4.6; they are categorised into three major risk families.  
Table 4.6: Example of Characteristics of Risk Events 
Category Market Risk Credit Risk Operational Risk 
 1. Asset allocation 1. Investments 1. Internal control 
violation 
 2. Concentration 2. Reinsurance 2. Project failure 
 3. Others 3. Others 3. Others 
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The results of the cladistics analysis applied to the risk events are displayed in Figure 
4.7 below. 
Figure 4.7: A Cladogram is Constructed Based on Risk Events Provided Above. 

Basically, the cladogram classifies 22 risk-event types into different groups. One of the 
significant implications is how different risk events are classified into several groups, 
as well as discussions of the drivers causing them. For instance, risks in the blue circle 
are more likely in one group dominated by ‘Change or Variance,’ while risks in the red 
group are more related to the ‘Implementation in Products and Models.’ Besides such 
risk-event classifications, characteristics of risk events labelled on the nodes provides 
much information on their connections as well. Only one of them (‘Internal Control’) 
is highlighted in the graph for easy reading. It is a family characteristic that is shared 
by all risk events in the group in the green circle.  
 
The structure of a cladogram in cladistics analysis can show many implications for both 
theoretical and practical risk management(Allan & Yin 2010). Once a large group of 
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risk events are classified into different branches, the comparison of characteristics that 
are located on the nodes can let people investigate them even further. Not only the 
commonalities and distinguishing among these risk events, but also, the logical 
hypothesis that can be generated based on the classification (Andreatta & Ribeiro 2002).  
 
Furthermore, with unique results presented in the cladistics analysis, people can 
understand the rate and direction of risk evolution and get an overview of the risk 
system because the analysis visualises all risk events and their characteristics into one 
map(Allan & Yin 2010). If the analysis could embed the time of risk events, such as 
running an analysis over different periods and comparing their cladograms of risk 
events, it could reveal relationships between risk events at different periods of time in 
terms of their risk characteristics and classification. Li et al. (2017) applied cladistics 
analysis on such time-dependent data and achieved significant results for operational 
risk. Specifically, they analysed 2,141 operational risk events in European and US 
banks between 2008–2014. The characteristics used to distinguish operational risk 
events come from Basel II, as shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Basel II Characteristics  
 Characteristic 
1 Unauthorized activity 
2 Theft and fraud (Internal) 
3 Theft and fraud (External) 
4 Systems security 
5 Employee relations 
6 Discrimination 
7 Suitability, disclosure & fiduciary 
8 Improper practices 
9 Products flaws 
10 Exposure 
11 Advisory activities 
12 Disasters and other events 



13 Systems 
14 Monitoring and reporting 
15 Account management 
16 Multiple people 
17 Single person 
18 Credit card 
19 Big banks involved 
20 ATM 
21 Derivatives 
 
Part of the results in the US Market from 2008–2014 are shown for simple illustration 
in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in US Markets 
(Independent Periods) 

 
Li et al. (2017) used cladistics analysis over operational-risk events on three periods; 
2008–2010, 2011–2012 and 2013–2014. Table 4.8 highlights the significant Level 1 
characteristics for the three independent periods for the US Banks. Furthermore, the 
three periods share many common characteristics, such as ‘Theft and Fraud (internal)’; 
‘Theft and Fraud (external)’; ‘Systems Security’; ‘Improper Practice’ and ‘Big Banks 
Involved.’ Time-dependent results can assist people in exploring the drivers of 
operational-risk events across time, and it turns out that banks in the United States have 
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a relatively stable range of drivers because their major Level 1 characteristics are very 
similar. Applying cladistics analysis with embedding periods provides a new dynamic 
insight to manage the drivers of operational risk and mitigate risk events, along with 
time. 
 
Cladistics analysis is a method to organise events into different groups in a CAS based 
on the characteristics of each event. It can be applied both in and outside biology where 
it is assumed the system is a CAS. For example, in the case of enterprise risk, it is 
assumed that the financial system is a CAS and cladistics analysis is a suitable method 
to classify risk events. Similarly in this thesis, under the assumption that the economic 
system is a CAS, then cladistics analysis is an appropriate method to analyse credit risk 
events.  
4.5: Summary 
This chapter introduced a methodology called cladistics analysis. It is essentially a 
classification method to organise events that arise from a CAS. Moreover, this chapter 
provided a brief description about its original application in biology, and the three major 
algorithms for constructing cladograms. Then three examples of applications of the 
methodology to systems outside biology are provided, especially in the field of risk 
management, it gives many new insights and inspirations in managing other type of 
risk.  
 

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Chapter 5: Data and Analysis 
5.1: Introduction  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 discussed the literature on credit risk and risk-management models, 
CAS and cladistics analysis. Chapter 3 also identified that the economic system, where 
credit-risk events occur is a typical example of a CAS. Chapter 4 introduced a method 
called cladistics analysis and some applications outside biology. These applications 
indicate that cladistics analysis is appropriate to use if the system is justified as a CAS. 
The economic system where credit defaults occur is justified as a CAS, and cladistics 
analysis will then be adopted on credit risk events in this chapter. This chapter will 
outline both corporate and individual credit risk data used and its transformation 
undertaken for cladistics analysis to validate the application of the methodology.  
This chapter consists of the following: 
Section 5.2, which provides a description of corporate default data; 
Section 5.3, which provides an overview of corporate default data; 
Section 5.4, which provides identification of characteristics being used in the 
analysis; 
Section 5.5, which provides a description of individual bankruptcy and event 
characteristics; 
Section 5.6, which provides an overview of individual bankruptcy data; and  
Section 5.7, which provides an illustration of a cladogram of corporate default 
events. 
 
 
 
 
 


5.2: Description of Corporate Default Data 
During the period 1990-2010, the US economy went through two big economic cycles. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show GDP growth and interest rates for the US during this period.  
Figure 5.1, GDP Growth2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product [A191RL1Q225SBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A191RL1Q225SBEA, November 18, 2018 
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Figure 5.2, Interest Rate3 
 
 
GDP growth had negative increases during the years 1990, 2000 and 2009. Interest rate 
went up to a high level during the years 1990, 2000 and 2007. During this period, US 
has three periods of low growth and three periods of high interest rates which are major 
reason for credit default events. Because credit defaults can last months or years from 
detection to resolution, the corporate default data selected for this analysis is a relative 
long period from 1990-2010. The corporate data used is from the global database of 
corporate credit defaults maintained by Moody’s.4 An example of a default event 
record is shown in Figure 5.3, and more detail is shown in Appendix D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 International Monetary Fund, Interest Rates, Discount Rate for United States [INTDSRUSM193N], retrieved from FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INTDSRUSM193N, November 18, 2018 
4 Default and Recovery Database from Moody’s Analytics  
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Figure 5.3: Example of Recorded Default Data 

 
The data-set used records of default events globally from 1990–2010, and the details 
for each default includes default date, default type, resolution date, resolution type and 
a description of the event. The event’s description includes the company’s name, details 
of the default product, as well as the default amount. However, some records do not 
provide enough information and only have limited details. In order to get a 
comprehensive review of each default event and extract relatively precise 
characteristics of those events, records with inadequate information were deleted. 
Consequently, there are 743 default events in the dataset: 617 in the United States, 45 
in Europe, and 81 in Asia. 
5.3: Corporate Default Data Overview 
Figure 5.4 shows the proportion of each default type in the dataset. ‘Miss principal 
payments and interests’ is the major type of default event, which accounts for 55% of 
total defaults. ‘File Chapter 11’ accounts for another 25% and is the second highest 
default type. A default event normally lasts from months to years because it is 
calculated from when the default detected to resolution. A default event might be 
recorded multiple times when the target company repays interest owed or announces 
bankruptcy finally. In this analysis, such multiple-recorded events for a single 


corporation are viewed as one event, with all their characteristics from all periods used 
in the analysis. As corporate default takes several months or even years from detection 
to resolution, for time dependent analysis, events were considered over three-year 
periods together, as shown in Figure 5.5. It clearly shows the default number peaks 
around the periods of 1999–2001 and 2008–2010.5  
Figure 5.4: Default Types 

Figure 5.5: Default Number 

 
5 Data only shows defaults until 2010; many defaults originating during the financial crisis might be detected after 2010 and did 
not show up here. 
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5.4: Identification of Default Event Characteristics for Cladistics 
Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, characteristics of events are the basic element in 
constructing a cladogram because the algorithm essentially organises events by 
investigating their characteristics. There are several different algorithms to construct a 
tree in the “parsimony” family, for example Camin-Sokal parsimony (Camin & Sokal 
1965), Wagner parsimony(Kluge & Farris 1969), Fitch parsimony(Fitch, Walter M 
1971) and Dollo parsimony(Dollo 1893). Y. Li (2018) summarised the difference 
between these algorithms’ assumptions: 
“ 
1. Camin-Sokal parsimony assumes evolution is irreversible, i.e. a derived 
character state cannot return to its ancestral state. 
2. Wagner parsimony assumes evolution is reversible, and the rates of change in 
either direction is roughly the same. It also assumes ordered characters, i.e., a 
change from state 3 to state 1 must pass through state 2.  
3. Fitch parsimony assumes evolution is reversible with approximately the same 
change rate in each direction, and it considers all characters as unordered, i.e., 
a change from state 3 to state 1 does not have to go through state 2. 
4. Dollo parsimony (Dollo, 1893) assumes the transition from the ancestral state 
is very rare, but there is no restriction on transitions from derived state to 
ancestral state.” 

Because credit default is an event that has happened in the past, and the characteristics 
of each event are fixed and will not change in the future. In other words, the 
characteristics state of a default cannot return to its previous state. Camin-Sokal 
parsimony is then an appropriate analysis for this research and a software based on the 
algorithm will be used to construct cladogram. The software used in this research to 
implement the algorithm is provided by Allan et al. (2012) 


The process to derive the characteristics set from each individual event’s characteristics 
were selected from software6 that was used to count the common words in Moody’s 
descriptions of default events. Common usage words that did not assist in classifying 
default events were then eliminated, and the remaining words were then reduced to a 
manageable number for the cladistics analysis software and grouped by common terms 
used to describe defaults.  
Table 5.1: Word Frequency Summary of Moody’s Default Description 

 
6 Hermetic Word Frequency Counter Advanced Version: http://www.hermetic.ch/wfca/wfca 

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For each corporate default event, the relevant characteristics were derived from the 
description of the defaults. Table 5.2 shows 13 characteristics used in the analysis that 
represent the most commonly occurring of those default events.  
Table 5.2: Characteristics of Default Events 
Characteristics of default Descriptions 
Failed Strategy Events involving obvious inappropriate strategy and 
acquisition 
Competition Events involving high competition 
Weak Revenue Performance Events involving weak revenue performance 
High Leverage Company in the default event has high debt leverage 
Weak Economy Large negative impact from weak economy 
Cash Flow Issue Company has liquidity issue 
External Event Large negative impact from external events, such as bad 
weather, terrorist attack and other unexpected events 
Poor Management/Implementation Large negative impact from inside management 
Weak Industry The industry sector is in a weak period 
Global Business Company’s business is worldwide 
Real Estate Investment Company has investments in real estate 
Currency Event is affected by variation of currency 
Regulation/Legal Suit Regulation change or has legal suit trouble 

5.5: Description of Individual Bankruptcy Data and Event 
Characteristics 
Credit default at the individual level is also another major category in credit risk 
management for banks. Despite looking similar in terms of the default definition, the 



underlying drivers might be different. For instance, for both corporate or individual 
persons, their credit is both affected by macro-economic environment, but whether the 
economic factor is the key factor influencing the credit and lead to default needs 
analysis. In this research, similar methods will be adopted for the bankruptcy data at 
personal level, and compare the underlying drivers with those at corporate level. 
 
To analyse individual credit default systemic characteristics, the data used is supplied 
by the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) that related to almost 29,000 
bankruptcies over the period 2008~2016. According to the data description from AFSA, 
every debtor who becomes bankrupt or proposes a debt agreement or personal 
insolvency agreement is required to lodge a completed statement of affairs with the 
AFSA. The data is a random sample of 10% of bankruptcies each financial year from 
2007–08 to 2015–16. There are 22 data fields that address bankruptcy events and they 
are summarised in Table 5.3, while full details are displayed in Appendix G. 
Table 5.3: Fields of Individual Data Description 
Anonymous ID Occupation Description 
Administration Group Occupation Code 
Administration Type Primary Income Source 
Gender Gross Income 
FY of Bankruptcy Spouse Income 
Age at Insolvency Spouse Income Frequency 
Family Situation State 
Primary Cause of Bankruptcy Remoteness Area 
Business Related Bankruptcy Remoteness Code 
Source of Bankruptcy Information Total Liabilities 
Previously Bankrupt Total Assets 
 
As the characteristics for a cladistics analysis need to be determined as either occurring 
or not occurring for each unique event, the characteristics are transformed into those 


shown in Table 5.4. For each bankruptcy, the characteristics were then determined as 
being in Cladistics State 1 or Cladistics State 0. Cladistics State 1 is defined for the 
characteristics that were most likely to have a negative impact on bankruptcy. 
Conversely, for Cladistics State 0, and by way of example, for the Gross Income 
characteristic, the Cladistics State 1 is determined to be when the Gross Income was 
less than $60,000, while Cladistics State 0 was when the Gross Income was greater than 
$60,000. 
 
Table 5.4: Characteristics Used in the Bankruptcy Analysis 
Characteristics Cladistics State 1 Cladistics State 0 
Gender Male Female 
Age at Insolvency  <65 >65 
Dependents With Dependents Without Dependents 
Business Related Bankruptcy Related Not Related 
Previously Bankrupt Yes No 
Primary Income is Salary Yes No 
Gross Income <$60000 >$60000 
Spouse Income <$10000 >$10000 
Credit Card Liability Yes No 
Personal Loan Yes No 
No Funds in Bank No Funds Has Funds 
Superannuation and Life 
Insurance Policies 
<$5000 >$5000 
No Real Property Asset No Real Property Asset Has Real Property Asset 
Vehicle Asset Value <$10000 >$10000 
Living in a Major City  Yes No 



5.6: Individual Bankruptcy Data Overview 
Figure 5.6 shows the proportion of gender in terms of the number of bankruptcies. 
Overall, males (58%) have more bankruptcies than females (42%), according to the 
recorded data. Figure 5.7 shows all bankruptcies from 2008–2016. There was a two-
year peak period between 2009–2010, and then the number slightly decreased in 2016. 
Figure 5.8 shows the number of bankruptcies based on age range. People between the 
ages of 40 to 45 have more bankruptcies than any other age ranges.  
Figure 5.6: Gender vs. Number of Bankruptcies  

Figure 5.7: Year vs Number of Bankruptcy  



Figure 5.8: Age vs Number of Bankruptcies  

 
Moreover, cladistics analysis is only concerned with unique events, i.e., events that 
have a unique combination of characteristics. Removing bankruptcies with identical 
characteristics resulted in the number of unique events for each year, as shown in Table 
5.5. 
Table 5.5: Number of Unique Bankruptcies in Each Year 
Year Number 
2008 1,240 
2009 1,407 
2010 1,616 
2011 1,563 
2012 1,645 
2013 1,631 
2014 1,560 
2015 1,546 
2016 1,484 
5.7: Illustration of Cladogram of Default Events 
The output of the cladistics analysis is a cladogram, which shows the links between 
each credit default event by their characteristics, moving from the characteristics unique 

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to each event on the right-hand side of the tree through to the characteristics most in 
common with other credit default events on the left-hand side. Figure 5.9 shows a part 
of the credit default cladistics tree for the Asian economic zone for all defaults, where 
all the credit default events have the common (left-hand side) characteristic, ‘Cash Flow 
Issue.’ 
Figure 5.9: Cash Flow Branch of Cladistics Tree 

In this ‘branch,’ there are 18 risk events, and the company names are labelled on the 
right-hand side. The first default is from the Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank (RKB), with the 
characteristics ‘Cash Flow Issue,’ ‘Failed Strategy,’ ‘External Event’ and ‘Weak 
Economy’. The ‘Cash Flow Issue’ is called a ‘Level 1 characteristic,’ as it is located in 
the most left position on the branch, which indicates it is the most systemic 
characteristic among these 18 events. In this illustration, ‘Cash Flow’ can be considered 
as a Level 1 characteristic and the most systematic characteristic, with the sub-branches 
‘Failed Strategy,’ ‘Poor Management’ and ‘International Business’ being Level 2 
characteristics. These are less systemic than those in Level 1. Full cladograms are 
shown in Appendix E.   

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Chapter 6: Cladistics Analysis for Different Economic Zones 
This chapter focusses on the outcomes of cladistics analysis on defaults across three 
different economic zones. The Level 1 characteristics are the most systemic factors, 
which are shared by those default events, and they are the characteristics that are worth 
investigating in terms of managing credit risk efficiently because they have the greatest 
impact. Additionally, the connections between Level 1 and other characteristics are also 
very much worth studying and monitoring to detect emerging combinations of 
characteristics and new events.  
This chapter consists of the following: 
Section 6.1 is results from the Asian Market; 
Section 6.2 is results from the European Market; 
Section 6.3 is results from the US Market; and 
Section 6.4 is the comparison of drivers of the three economic zones’ credit 
defaults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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6.1: Results from the Asian Market 
The cladogram for the Asian economic zone is displayed in Figure 6.1 above. The five 
Level 1 characteristics are highlighted in blue. ‘Weak Economy’ is classified as the 
most significant characteristic because the denominated branch is the largest among the 
five Level 1 characteristics. This indicates that ‘Weak Economy’ is the most important 
characteristic that could lead an Asian company to default. ‘Cash Flow Issue’ and 
‘Weak Revenue’ are the second and third ranked characteristics and dominate 
approximately 20% of default events.  
Figure 6.1: Cladogram of Asian Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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The major characteristics at both Level 1 and Level 2 and summarised below. 
Figure 6.2: Level 1 and Level 2 characteristics in Asia market 

The major Level 2 characteristics based on the number of related default events within 
their branch are highlighted in blue. An analysis of the combination of Level 1 and 
major Level 2 characteristics can provide more insights on credit defaults in the Asian 
market. In the branch that is dominated by a ‘Weak Economy’ at Level 1, there are two 
major characteristics at Level 2, ‘High Leverage’ and ‘Currency.’ Further, there are a 
number of defaults related to ‘High Leverage’ that exceed those that relate to ‘Currency.’ 
The organisation of this group of defaults together might indicate that there is a large 
probability that companies with high leverage will default when macroeconomic results 
are adverse, and greater attention should be paid to them from a risk management 
perspective.  
 
‘Weak Economy’ is also very active at Level 2 in the results. For instance, it is the 
largest sub-branch under the Level 1 characteristics ‘Weak Revenue’ and ‘Weak 

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Industry.’ ‘Weak Economy’ contributes a very significant amount of weight in both 
branches. Such a phenomenon indicates that a ‘Weak Economy’ is a very key factor in 
credit default risk in an emerging market such as Asia. ‘Cash Flow Issue’ is another 
major characteristic at Level 1. It is obvious that if a company’s cash flow is in trouble 
and they have liquidity problems, defaults are very likely to happen. The Level 2 
characteristics in the ‘Cash Flow Issue’ branch are ‘Global Business,’ ‘Failed Strategy’ 
and ‘Poor Management.’ This suggests that if Asian companies default from a cash 
flow issue, this is accompanied by several company specific factors; for instance, they 
have global business or they created the wrong strategy or have very poor 
implementation and management.  
6.2: Results from the European Market 
Figure 6.3: Cladogram of European Market 

As illustrated in the above cladogram, there are four major Level 1 characteristics, 
including ‘Cash Flow Issue,’ ‘Weak Industry,’ ‘Competition’ and ‘Failed Strategy.’ 
‘Competition’ and ‘Failed Strategy’ indicates that European companies are very likely 
to have defaults if they meet high levels of competition or adopt a wrong strategy. This 


reflects that in Europe, companies and their countries are highly interconnected since 
they mostly share a common economic market, which leads to them facing a highly 
competitive business environment. 
Figure 6.4: Level 1 and Level 2 Characteristics in European market 

Similar to the analysis for the Asian economic zone, Level 1 and Level 2 characteristics 
with the largest weight characteristics within a group are highlighted in blue.  
 
The factors that are driving European companies to default are more internal than 
external. For instance, ‘Competition’ and ‘Failed Strategy’ are included in a very high 
percentage of related defaults. This is especially true when a company with very ‘Weak 
Revenue’ faces high competition, or a company with ‘High Leverage Debt’ is combined 
with a wrong strategy. Thus, those characteristic combinations could be captured on the 

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cladogram easily when default number weights are calculated between Level 2 
characteristics.  
 
‘Global Business’ plays a unique and important role among defaults in the European 
market and it appears multiple times in Level 2 characteristics. The structure of the 
cladogram indicates that it is a very open characteristic, which means it is very easy to 
combine with many other characteristics in Level 1, leading to a group of default events. 
In traditional credit risk analysis, this is a characteristic that is ignored often, and the 
ways that it connects with other factors are very difficult to discover without analysis 
such as cladistics, which is based on their relationships.  
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6.3: Results from the US market 
Because there is a massive amount of default data for the US market, only the major 
Level 1 and Level 2 characteristics are shown in this part. The full cladogram is shown 
in Appendix E. 
Figure 6.5: Level 1 and Level 2 Characteristics in US Market 

 
There are five major Level 1 characteristics, including ‘Cash Flow Issue’, ‘Weak 
Industry’, ‘Poor Management,’ ‘High Leverage’ and ‘External Event.’ The 
characteristics at Level 1 are very diversified, which might indicate that defaults in US 
companies may have many causes and the market is relatively more complex. It is very 
difficult to predict them by just one type of model. 
 

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‘Weak Revenue Performance’ is a common characteristic among default events. 
However, from the results of the US market, it behaves very actively at Level 2 and 
dominates the largest number of defaults in multiple branches. Also, a large proportion 
of default events have characteristic combinations, such as ‘Weak Performance’ and 
‘Poor Management,’ as well as ‘Weak Performance’ and unexpected ‘External Events.’ 
Another interesting characteristic in the US market is ‘Regulation/Legal Suit.’ It 
dominates two sub-branches under ‘High Leverage’ and ‘External Event,’ which is very 
rare to see in other markets. It might indicate that the environment of regulation in the 
US market is tight and as such, it is easier to give extra pressure on the company’s 
default risk.  
6.4: Comparison of Drivers of the Three Economic Zones’ Credit 
Defaults 
6.4.1: Comparison of Level 1 Characteristics  
The major Level 1 characteristics in each market are summarised in Table 6.1 below, 
where the characteristics are shown in order of their relative importance. This is 
determined by the percentage of total defaults in each economic zone for Level 1 
characteristics and linked to more than 10% of credit default events.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Some events might be shared by two major characteristics, if so total weights will excess 100%. 
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Table 6.1: Level 1 Characteristics and Their Relative Importance 
US Europe Asia 
Cash Flow Issue (34%) Cash Flow Issue (44%) Weak Economy (28%) 
High Leverage (24%) Weak Industry (22%) Cash Flow Issue (24%) 
Poor Management (22%) Competition (16%) Weak Revenue Performance 
(22%) 
Weak Industry (14%) Failed Strategy (13%) Currency (16%) 
External Event (14%)  Weak Industry (11%) 
 
The analysis shows the three economic zones have some common Level 1 
characteristics, but they also show some unique Level 1 characteristics, i.e., the 
systemic drivers of credit default in Asia, Europe and the US are similar but not 
identical. This indicates that whilst credit defaults happen in different economic zones 
for similar reasons, there are also unique systemic drivers that need to be considered 
when assessing credit risks in these different economic zones.  
 
Specifically, ‘Cash Flow Issue’ is the most significant characteristic in default events 
across the three economic zones. It takes the first position of weights in the US and 
European markets and the second in Asia. Clearly, it is a crucial characteristic of default 
events no matter where the company is located geographically. This indicates that no 
matter what other factors change, it is highly likely to eventually lead to a default if a 
company’s cash flow is in trouble, and by implication, once a company experiences 
cash flow problems, it is unlikely to recover. Besides ‘Cash Flow Issue,’ characteristics 
in the top three positions are very different across the three markets. ‘High Leverage’ 
and ‘Poor Management’ dominates defaults in the US, whilst ‘Weak Industry’ and 
‘Competition’ dominates defaults in Europe. In Asia, factors include ‘Weak Economy’ 
and ‘Weak Revenue Performance.’ Those results provide many extensive global 
insights when looking at defaults and assessing credit risk across different markets.  

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6.4.2: Comparison of Controllable/Uncontrollable Characteristics among Three 
Economic Zones 
Determinates of corporate default can occur both from internal and controllable 
financial factors and external uncontrollable factors arising from the macroeconomy 
(Carling et al. 2007). The thirteen characteristics extracted from the default description 
in the analysis are classified into those that are predominately affected by issues 
controllable by a company and those predominately uncontrollable by a company in 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Characteristics of Default Events Used in the Cladistics Analysis 
Characteristics of Default Controllable/Uncontrollable 
Failed Strategy Controllable 
Competition Uncontrollable 
Weak Revenue Performance Controllable 
High Leverage Controllable 
Weak Economy Uncontrollable 
Cash Flow Issue Controllable 
External Event Uncontrollable 
Poor 
Management/Implementation 
Controllable 
Weak Industry Uncontrollable 
Global Business Controllable 
Real Estate Investment Controllable 
Currency Uncontrollable 
Regulation/Legal Suit Uncontrollable 

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In terms of the drivers that are controllable and those that are uncontrollable, Figure 6.6 
shows those Level 1 characteristics that are controllable in green, and those that are not 
controllable in yellow as percentages of total defaults in each economic zone. 
Figure 6.6: Proportion of Controllable and Uncontrollable Level 1 
Characteristics                   
US Europe Asia 

 
The results indicate that US Level 1 characteristics are significantly controllable by the 
companies, and to a lesser extent, by EU companies. For Asian companies, factors that 
are deemed to be outside the companies’ control are much more significant. The results 
indicate that US and EU companies’ credit defaults are more driven by internal and 
controllable decisions than macroeconomic factors; however, Asian companies’ credit 
defaults are significantly affected by macroeconomic factors outside the control of the 
companies. The implication of this result is that credit assessments need to take into 
account companies’ exposure to macroeconomic factors, especially outside the United 
States. Also, the analysis indicates those factors that are likely to dominate defaults and 
should be given greater weight in the assessment of likely defaults. It also gives insights 
into the appropriate credit risk management process. For companies in US, credit risk 
assessment should put more weight on the financial situation of the business, for 
example, a company’s leverage, cash flow situation, and whether the business model is 
sustainable. For those companies that come from other economic zones like Asia, credit 
risk assessment should put more weight on external factors, for example, regulatory 
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change, risk exposure to their country’s currency, and how resilient they are if there is 
a recession.  
6.5: Summary 
This chapter applied the system-based methodology of cladistics analysis to global 
credit default data. The analysis not only organises defaults by classifying their 
characteristics by different levels of importance but also, provided a way to reflect their 
interconnections. The Level 1 characteristics for default events can be thought of as the 
most systemic characteristics as they apply to the most defaults and therefore it can 
prevent occurrence of defaults and reduce possible financial losses caused by defaults 
by only controlling the Level 1 characteristics analysed by cladistics analysis. 
 
Based on the analysis across the three different economic zones, it offers very 
interesting results on major characteristics of defaults and gives novel and dynamic 
insights to assess credit defaults, which is not achievable by traditional methods. The 
results imply that the major drivers of credit default across different economic zones 
are similar but not identical. This indicates that whilst credit defaults happen in different 
economic zones for similar reasons, there are also unique systemic drivers that need to 
be considered when assessing credit risks in these different economic zones. Moreover, 
defaults in the United States are more driven by controllable factors than the other two 
markets. Those differences should be taken into account in credit risk management, and 
the same model or methodology will not work for all areas. 
 
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Chapter 7: US Period Analysis of Corporate Credit Defaults 
7.1: Behaviour of Level 1 Characteristics in Cumulative Analysis 
The data for the US is significantly greater than the other two economic zones, and 
consequently, a more detailed analysis looking at trends over time is restricted to US 
defaults to explore the stability of the drivers of default. To explore how default event 
characteristics may have changed over time, the 2-year-period 1990–1991 has been 
analysed, and then events occurring in each of the subsequent years have been added. 
After 2000, the data in some years was relatively small, so these have been omitted 
from the analysis, and the data has been combined. Table 7.1 shows a summary of Level 
1 characteristics in the cumulative periods. Full detail of cladograms will be displayed 
in Appendix F. 
 
Table 7.1: US Level 1 Characteristics for Cumulative Periods  
1990–
1991 
1990–
1992 
1990–
1993 
1990–
1994 
1990–
1995 
1990–
1996 
1990–
1997 
1990–
1998 
1990–
1999 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Failed 
strategy 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
Weak 
Revenue 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
 External 
Event 
External 
Event 
External 
Event 
Weak 
Industry 
Weak 
Industry 
Weak 
Industry 
Weak 
Industry 
Weak 
Industry 
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1990-2000 1990-2002 1990-2005 1990-2010 
 External Event External Event External Event 
Weak Revenue Weak Revenue Weak Revenue Weak Revenue 
High Leverage High Leverage High Leverage High Leverage 
Cash Flow Issue Cash Flow Issue Cash Flow Issue Cash Flow Issue 
Failed Strategy   Failed Strategy 
  Poor Management Poor Management 
  Competition Global Business 
  Weak Industry Weak Industry 
 
The results in Table 7.1 suggest there is a stable and consistent pattern of US 
characteristics with the controllable characteristics ‘Weak Revenue’ and ‘High 
Leverage’ appearing throughout the whole period. ‘Cash Flow Issue,’ ‘Weak Industry’ 
and ‘External Events’ last a short time throughout the period. ‘Failed Strategy’ is also 
prominent but not consistent, especially after 2000. Table 7.1 results support the 
argument that US credit defaults are driven more from controllable characteristics than 
uncontrollable characteristics on a sustainable basis.  
7.2: Emerging Characteristics in Lower Levels 
The characteristics positioned in low levels in a cladogram have the potential to transfer 
to a high level when new risk events happen and influence the results. Moreover, it is 
important to monitor characteristics that may emerge into a systemic one, especially in 
a long-period of analysis. The structure of the cladogram allows us to observe 
characteristics emerging over time from lower levels into higher levels. For example, 
characteristics can be observed moving from a less systemic branch to a more systemic 
branch, indicating that the characteristics are becoming more common across the events 
being monitored. As such, this may result in new events emerging with different 


characteristic combinations to that seen previously. This ‘emergence’ of new events is 
a result of the complex system adapting to changes in the environment and is illustrated 
in Figure 7.1. This is where characteristic C3 is moving from a Level 3 characteristic 
to a Level 2 and then Level 1 characteristic across time, with the consequence of new 
events occurring from characteristic combinations that have not been seen previously. 
Figure 7.1: Emergence of New Risk Events 

 
The dominant Level 1 characteristics are not always stable, and the process that new 
characteristics move from less systemic level to a more systemic level is called 
emergence. Emerging characteristics are created by interactions in the system such as 
change in regulation and economic cycles. Emergence is an essential outcome of a 
CAS’s self-organisation. Cladistics analysis and cladogram help us to identify and 
monitor what has happened and indicates potential emerging characteristics of default 
events, which is impossible for traditional models. 
 
One example of emergence of characteristics to be more systemic is shown in Table 
7.2, where the number of occurrences of the uncontrollable characteristic ‘Weak 

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Industry’ at various levels in the branches over the period is shown. ‘Weak Industry’ 
does not occur in Level 1 until the data for 1995 is added, and then remains as a Level 
1 characteristic thereafter. Not only is ‘Weak Industry’ an important Level 1 
characteristic after 1994, it also appeared as a Level 2 and Level 3 characteristic and 
can be seen as an emerging characteristic in earlier years. However, ‘Weak Industry’ 
drops off as a Level 1 characteristic in the early 2000s and then remerges in the later 
2000s, illustrating the complexity of the economic system in which companies operate 
and the continual adaptation to factors affecting companies. These results should then 
inform credit management personnel that there is instability in the economic system 
that needs to be taken into account when assessing credit risks, and that linear-based 
regression analysis should be treated with care in the short term. 
 
Table 7.2: Number of Occurrences of ‘Weak Industry’ in Cumulative Periods 
 1990–
1991 
1990–
1992 
1990–
1993 
1990–
1994 
1990–
1995 
1990–
1996 
1990–
1997 
1990–
1998 
1990–
1999 
Level 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Level 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 
Level 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 2 4 1 

 1990–
2000 
1990–
2002 
1990–
2005 
1990–
2010 
Level 1 0 0 1 1 
Level 2 3 2 3 2 
Level 3 2 3 2 9 




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7.3: Non-Emerging Characteristics in Lower Levels 
For other Level 2 and 3 characteristics, such as ‘Weak Economy,’ they do not emerge 
at Level 1 but remain active in Level 2 and Level 3. The number of occurrences of 
‘Weak Economy’ and its related proportion of total events is shown in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Number of Occurrence and Weighting of ‘Weak Economy’ 
 90–91 90–92 90–93 90–94 90–95 90–96 90–97 90–98 90–99 
Level 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Level 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 
No. of 
events in 
Level 2  
6 16 18 10 16 20 11 0 0 
Weights in 
that period 
(%) 
9.5% 18.4% 17.5% 8.9% 12.3% 14.9% 7.6% 0% 0% 
From Table 7.3, it is easy to observe that ‘Weak Economy’ does not emerge at Level 1 
throughout the entire period. However, the weights are significant in each period and 
change dramatically from 0% to 18.4%. Although ‘Weak Economy’ is not a high-level 
characteristic, it is a major sub-group in Level 2 and needs to be watched for risk 
management purposes. As a characteristic from the external environment, it usually 
interacts with company-specific characteristics; for example, ‘High Leverage’ and 
‘Weak Revenue’ resulting in a default event. The variation of the impact of ‘Weak 
Economy’ is also consistent with the macroeconomic cycle. Table 7.4 compares the 
weights of ‘Weak Economy’ in Level 2 with the GDP growth rate8 in the US market. 
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Table 7.4: ‘Weak Economy’ Comparison with GDP Growth 
 90–91 90–92 90–93 90–94 90–95 90–96 90–97 90–98 90–99 
No. of 
events in 
Level 2 
6 16 18 10 16 20 11 0 0 
Weights in 
that period 
(%) 
9.5% 18.4% 17.5% 8.9% 12.3% 14.9% 7.6% 0% 0% 

 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP 
Growth 
3.68% 1.92% -0.07% 3.56% 2.75% 4.04% 2.72% 3.8% 4.49% 4.45% 4.69% 
Table 7.4 shows that the behaviour of a ‘Weak Economy’ in Level 2 reflects the real 
economic situation in the 1990s in the US market. A dramatic decrease in economic 
growth from 1989 to 1991 correlates with ‘Weak Economy’-related events that 
increased from 9.5% to 18.4% and 17.5% in the following years. Over the next four 
years, the economic growth rates are at a medium level and correlate with the weights 
for ‘Weak Economy,’ dropping to a medium level of around 10%. Finally, the last four 
years’ high growth rate correlates with relatively low-level weights. Clearly, macro-
economic factor has strong impact on number of defaults. The characteristic ‘Weak 
Economy’ needs to be taken into account in determining the likelihood of credit defaults 
but on a cyclical basis, not on an assumed constant basis that might be derived from 
regression analysis that fails to recognise the complexity of the economy.  
 
7.4: Discussion 
Period analysis in the United States shows that a few Level 1 characteristics dominate 
defaults between 1990–2010. The stability of results allows credit assessment to focus 


on those major characteristics. Besides the ‘most common’ Level 1 characteristics, 
behaviours of lower-level characteristics are very worthwhile to investigate as well. 
The cladogram makes it possible to observe whether a characteristic is emerging from 
an unsystematic to systematic level over time, as was shown for the characteristic 
‘Weak Industry’ in the US market analysis. Moreover, it also offers the possibility to 
study other characteristics that do not emerge at a high level but interact with 
characteristics in a dynamic way, such as the characteristic ‘Weak Economy’ in the US 
market analysis.

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Chapter 8: Cladistics Analysis of Individual Bankruptcy in 
Australia 
8.1: Introduction 
The application of cladistics analysis to corporate credit defaults gives very significant 
results, and indicates the analysis is able to explore the underlying drivers of credit 
default at the corporate level. A clear difference of results is observed among the three 
economic zones. In this chapter, the analysis will move from the corporate level to the 
individual level and explore the characteristics of individual bankruptcy from both the 
individual-specific aspects, as well as the external economic environmental aspects. 
8.2: Results of Level 1 Characteristics 
As described Table 5.4 in chapter 5, there are 16 characteristics that address a 
bankruptcy event.  
Table 5.4: Characteristics Used in the Bankruptcy Analysis 
Characteristics Cladistics State 1 Cladistics State 0 
Gender Male Female 
Age at Insolvency  <65 >65 
Dependents With Dependents Without Dependents 
Business Related Bankruptcy Related Not Related 
Previously Bankrupt Yes No 
Primary Income is Salary Yes No 
Gross Income <$60000 >$60000 
Spouse Income <$10000 >$10000 
Credit Card Liability Yes No 
Personal Loan Yes No 
No Funds in Bank No Funds Has Funds 
Superannuation and Life 
Insurance Policies 
<$5000 >$5000 

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No Real Property Asset No Real Property Asset Has Real Property Asset 
Vehicle Asset Value <$10000 >$10000 
Living in a Major City  Yes No 
 
Cladistics analysis organised the major characteristics that dominate risk events in each 
year. Table 8.1 summarises the results of major Level 1 characteristics occurring in the 
cladogram. The characteristics that relate to more than 5% of total bankruptcies are 
marked as 1, otherwise they are marked as 0 in Table 8.1. Stable and consistent 
occurring characteristics are highlighted in Table 8.1. Summary of Characteristic on 
each level are shown in Appendix H.

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Table 8.1: Summary of Significant Level 1 Characteristic
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gender 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Age <65 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Single 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
With Dependents 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Previously Bankrupt 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Gross Income <$60,000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spouse Income <$10,000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Credit Card Liability 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Personal Loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No Funds in Bank 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Superannuation <$5,000 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
No Real Property Asset 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Vehicle asset <$10,000 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
The table shows that the consistent systemic characteristics were identified as Age, 
Gross income, Spouse income, No real assets and Major city. This suggests that 
bankruptcies occur predominately within the pre-retirement population and, based on 
the results of McLeod and Kessler (1990) that “we find that differential vulnerability is 
not confined to income but extends to education and occupational status as well,” are 
driven by embedded socio-economic issues. 
 
Whilst cladistics analysis can identify sustainable systemic drivers that can then be 
managed as required rather than having to manage a wide range of characteristics, it is 
also possible to identify emerging characteristics that are currently existing at a lower 
level than the sustainable systemic characteristics. Table 8.2 shows the average number 
of bankruptcies each year when a non-systemic characteristic occurs in more than 50% 
of bankruptcies.   
Table 8.2: Emerging Characteristics 
Characteristic Average Proportion of Bankruptcies 
Motor Vehicle Ownership 73% 
Credit Card Liability 68% 
Gender 60% 
Superannuation & Insurance 57% 
Primary Income Source from Wages 
and Salary 
52% 
Whilst these secondary characteristics appear in much fewer bankruptcies than the 
systemic characteristics that typically occur in 80%+ of bankruptcies, they do indicate 
that a lack of assets (such as motor vehicle ownership, superannuation and insurance), 
credit card liabilities, primary income source and gender may emerge as a systemic 
characteristic. Overall, the cladistics analysis indicates that bankruptcies occur 
predominately amongst the pre-retirement population, while lower incomes associated 
with higher costs of living and access to credit card facilities are the consistent drivers 
of individual bankruptcies.  
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8.3: Macroeconomic Based Analysis 
Analysis of credit defaults based on macroeconomic factors have also been discussed 
quite frequently in the literature. Moreover, models and approaches have been 
summarised in previous chapters. However, there has not been any significant literature 
that analysed the relative significance of macroeconomic-based factors and micro-
characteristic-based factors on individual bankruptcies. The relative importance of 
these two categories of characteristics was shown in Shi, Allan, Evans and Yun (2018) 
to be important and not constant across the major economic zones of the world. The 
relative importance of these factors has important implications for credit assessments 
because the dominance of macroeconomic factors implies that assessment of an 
individual’s assets and liabilities are not that important.  
 
Introducing macroeconomic factors to the cladistics analysis is not straight forward due 
to the need to have binary options for each characteristic, and also, the need to avoid 
the effect of serial correlation frequently seen in macroeconomic data. To avoid 
introducing factors with high correlations between themselves, the cladistics analysis 
uses a change in GDP,9 change in interest rates,10 and a change in unemployment 
rates.11 The cladistics states were then set by determining whether the change in the 
macroeconomic factor was positive or negative. The analysis indicates that the change 
in interest rates and the change in the unemployment rate are very significant drivers of 
individual bankruptcies and are ranked with age and gross income. Table 8.3 shows the 
proportion of bankruptcies with the previously identified systemic drivers and the two 
 
9 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5206.0 Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, 
series ID A2298668K 
10 Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Table F, series FILRHLBVD, Lending rates; Housing loans; Banks; Variable; Discounted; 
Owner-occupier 
11 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 6291.0.55.001 Labour Force, Australia, series A84591147L

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identified macroeconomic drivers. Appendix I shows a summary of characteristics with 
macro-factors on each level in terms of number of related risk events. 
Table 8.3: Proportion of Bankruptcies  
Systemic Driver Proportion of Bankruptcies 
Age <65 32% 
Gross Income 15% 
Spouse Income 20% 
No Real Assets 4% 
Major City 5% 
Change in Interest Rate 17% 
Change in Unemployment Rate 18% 
 
While three macroeconomic factors are added into the characteristics set, ‘Change in 
Interest Rate’ and ‘Change in Unemployment Rate’ are very significant characteristics 
in Level 1 of the cladogram and are responsible for 17% and 18% of total bankruptcies, 
respectively. On the other hand, another economic factor, ‘Change in GDP,’ did not 
show up in the results.  
Importantly, cladistics analysis combines both macroeconomic characteristics and 
micro characteristics and concludes that both types of characteristics are systemic 
drivers of individual bankruptcies. The analysis supports the factors of assets and credit 
card liabilities taken into account in (Ali et al. 2016), but the results seems to indicate 
that the trend to bankruptcy of middle income Australians identified in Ramsay and 
Sim (2010) is not supported based on the definitions we used for the relevant Cladistics 
State 1. 
8.4: Discussion 
Previous chapters have employed cladistics analysis to investigate characteristics of 
default events in corporations. The major drivers that dominate default events across 
different economic zones can be classified into controllable and uncontrollable groups. 
This chapter moved analysis from the corporate level to the individual level. The 

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analysis used 29,000 personal bankruptcies from the Australian Financial Security 
Authority (AFSA) during 2008–2016. The results show that Age, Gross Income, 
Spouse Income, No Real Assets and Major City are five of the major characteristics 
and they show a stable pattern from 2008–2016. This indicates that drivers of 
bankruptcy come from socioeconomic issues, such as income and the place you live, 
rather than individual characteristics. This chapter also combined macroeconomic 
factors with micro-factors. The results show that ‘Change in Interest Rate’ and ‘Change 
in Unemployment Rate’ are very significant to personal bankruptcy. Although the 
analysis of corporate credit defaults indicated that for US corporations, characteristics 
that could be affected by the corporations themselves were the dominant characteristics, 
in Europe external characteristics were more important, and became dominant for Asian 
corporations. The cladistics analysis of Australian individual bankruptcies indicates a 
parallel result to that found for European and Asian corporations, in that embedded 
external characteristics appear to dominate the systemic characteristics but a possible 
self-controllable characteristic, namely credit card liabilities may be an emerging 
systemic characteristic.  
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Chapter 9: Power Law and Tipping Point 
9.1: Introduction  
As discussed in previous chapters, complex systems exhibit many dynamic features, 
such as self-organisation and emergence, arising from extensive interactions of system 
agents. In many types of complex systems in the real world, heavy tail scaling 
phenomenon are widely observed on variables that reflect the dynamical characteristics 
of the system (Marković & Gros 2014). For instance, the distribution of earthquake 
magnitudes (Pisarenko & Sornette 2003), the size of wildfires (Newman 2005) and 
social systems like wealth distribution (Levy & Solomon 1997), city population 
(Newman 2005), stock exchange price indices (Bak, Tang & Wiesenfeld 1988) and 
economic systems (Gabaix 2016). The theory of self-organised criticality or tipping 
point study have been developing for decades in academia, and it is intended to explain 
the existence of power law scaling across various complex systems (Marković & Gros 
2014). In this chapter, the existence of power law scaling in credit default risk will be 
tested and the existence of a tipping point will be detected as well. Given the 
justification of the economic system is a CAS, the objective of this chapter is to explore 
power law features and to explain the underlying mechanism behind such phenomenon.  
This chapter consists of the following: 
Section 9.1 is an introduction for the chapter; 
Section 9.2 analyses the power law test on credit risk; 
Section 9.3 discusses the tipping point analysis on credit risk; and 
Section 9.4 lists the implication on results. 
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9.2: Power Law Test on Credit Risk 
Earlier papers have observed that financial systems show very heavy tails in their 
distribution of outputs. Risks, such as market risk, reflect the volatility of stock indices, 
while operational risk, which is reflected by loss distribution in the bank industry, have 
been observed as having heavy tail distributions (Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou & 
Stanley 2003). This section will use the loss amount in default events to test if a power 
law distribution exists in credit risk.  
9.2.1: Data  
Because test of power law requires high frequency data across a long period, data used 
in this section is the outstanding amount of 1,897 default events in the United States 
over the period 2008–2014, all from the Bloomberg database which had sufficient data 
in this period and the default amounts are well recorded. Default amount and its 
logarithmic values are sorted from largest to smallest and shown in Figure 9.1.  
Figure 9.1: Default Amount vs Log Value 

It can be observed that the logarithmic value is roughly a linear shape, which gives a 
first impression that the data is very likely following a power law distribution. In this 
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chapter, a more rigorous method is applied from Clauset et al. (2009), which adopts a 
statistical process to test if the data obeys a power law distribution 
9.2.2: Process of Methodology from Clauset et al. (2009) 
According to Clauset, the steps of analysis are described as follows: 
§ Estimate the parameters Xmin and α of the power-law model; 
§ Calculate the goodness-of-fit between the data and the power law. If the 
resulting p-value is greater than 0.1, the power law is a plausible hypothesis for 
the data. Otherwise, it is rejected; 
§ Compare the power law with alternative hypotheses via a likelihood ratio test. 
For each alternative, if the calculated likelihood ratio is significantly different 
from zero, then its sign indicates whether the alternative is favoured over the 
power-law model or not.  
The essential objective of methodology is to fit a group of empirical data to a power 
law distribution. One of most popular methods is using a simple histogram. The power 
law basically describes a probability distribution of data (for example x) as:  
!(#) ∝ #&'
where ( is a constant parameter also known as the exponent parameter. 
 
Therefore, power law distribution also obeys ln ! # = 	( ln # + ./012302 . As 
illustrated in Figure 9.1, a common method in the literature is to build a histogram of 
value x’s frequency and add a logarithmic axis afterwards. If the logarithmic value 
behaves as a straight line, then the data x is believed to be a power law distribution. The 
slope of the straight line is the exponent parameter	(. However, Clauset et al. (2009) 
argued in their paper that such a method is not reliable because its results contain very 
large systematic errors. He proposed a much more accurate method for power law 
testing and parameter estimating. 
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9.2.3: Parameters Estimating 
There are two parameters to be estimated before power law testing, the lower bound of 
dataset Xmin and scaling parameter α. Because the distribution of a power law diverges 
at zero, there must be a lower bound Xmin, and the value of Xmin determines the 
accuracy of α as well(Clauset et al. 2009). If either two are too low or too high, Xmin 
is chosen, the truncated data that is to be tested will have a very high statistical error 
and results will be biased. (Clauset et al. 2009) proposed an approach for choosing the 
estimated Xmin, which makes the probability distribution of tested data and the best-
fit power law distribution as similar as possible. In detail, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics is applied to measure the maximum distance between two distributions: 
D = 	 max
898:;<
|> # − @ # |
where > #  is cumulative density function (CDF) of tested data and @ #  is the CDF 
of power law distribution at minimum value #ABC. 
After estimating #ABC , scaling parameter α is determined by the method of 
maximum likelihood, as:  
α = 1 + n ln
#B
#ABC
C
BFG
&G

where #B is the observed value in dataset x, which is greater than #ABC. 
 
It is worth pointing out that the test is built on the data above #ABC, and if the estimated 
#ABC is large, the number of data worked with might be insufficient which will bias the 
results. 
9.2.4: Power Law Testing 
Once the parameters are determined, further analysis will be applied to test if the data 
fits a power law distribution or not. The underlying idea behind the analysis is to sample 
many synthetic datasets from a true power law distribution, with parameters determined 

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and set out in the last section. Further, they will measure the distance that they fluctuate 
from the perfect power law distribution. Thereafter, the results are compared with the 
same measurement on the empirical data being tested. If the empirical data shows a 
longer distance from the power law than most of the synthetic sample, the dataset is 
believed to be not a plausible fit to power law distribution.  
 
P-value in the test is defined to be the fraction of the synthetics’ distances that are larger 
than the empirical distance. Therefore, if the p-value is large (close to 1), the distance 
for most synthetics sample data is larger than the empirical data, which indicates the 
empirical dataset is very close to perfect power law distribution. On the other hand, a 
small p-value indicates the data is not a plausible fit to power law distribution. 
 
Furthermore, the author also pointed out that even if the results show that the data is 
not a good fit to a power law distribution, it is still possible to fit with other heavy tailed 
distributions, such as exponential or log-normal. A further rigorous method is offered 
in the paper that compares the goodness of the fit between two possible distributions. 
9.2.5: Testing Results 
The data in Section 9.2.1 was used in the power law test, while 5,000 synthetic samples 
are generated in the analysis. Results are shown in Table 9.1, 
Table 9.1: Results of Power Law Testing on Credit Risk 
α 1.23 
Xmin 9700 
P-value 0 
The p-value shows that the credit default amount did not fit to a power law distribution. 
Further analysis comparing a power law and log-normal distribution was then 
undertaken. The concept of this method is to compare the likelihood of the data under 
two different assuming distributions. According to an explanation of the p-value in this 
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test, the result gives a zero p-value, indicating a log-normal is a better fit to the empirical 
dataset than power law. A graphic illustration is provided below. 
Figure 9.2: Comparison of Distribution of Credit Default Amount 

Figure 9.2 shows a graphical comparison of the distributions for credit default losses 
against the distributions predicted by a power law distribution and a log-normal 
distribution. The observed distribution is shown in black, the best fit power law 
distribution in red and the best fit log normal distribution in green. The horizontal axis 
shows the outstanding amount of credit risk lost, while the vertical axis shows the 
cumulative distribution function (denoted as P(x)). Figure 9.2 shows that the amount of 
credit default fits a log-normal distribution better than a power law distribution. It can 
be observed that the dataset is much more heavily tailed than a log-normal distribution.  
9.3: Tipping Point Analysis 
An indicator of a system having entered a period of instability is to identify a tipping 
point. However, there is no agreement as to how to best detect that a tipping point has 
occurred. One of the classic indicators used is to detect a ‘slowing down’ of recovery 
from variability. When a system converges towards a tipping point, it may become 
more vulnerable to small changes (Holling 1973), and it will slow down from recovery 
(Scheffer, Bascompte, Brock, Brovkin, Carpenter, Dakos, Held, Van Nes, Rietkerk & 
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Sugihara 2009), lose resilience and become vulnerable to small shocks, resulting in 
critical transitions. Takayasu, Watanabe and Takayasu (2010) used a relatively simple 
approach by applying a log-periodic power law (LPPL) model to financial data to detect 
significant variations, while Liu, Chen, Aihara and Chen (2015) indicated that for 
systems with significant ‘normal’ volatility, to detect a tipping point, it is better to use 
a proxy indicator and to consider the second moment of the proxy’s distribution because 
that dampens down the normal volatility to identify a tipping point. A combination of 
the methods used by Takayasu et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2015) to determine if credit 
defaults may have gone through a tipping point in the GFC is used. Figure 9.3 shows 
the standard deviation of the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Option-Adjusted 
Spread©, Percent, Daily, and Not Seasonally Adjusted on a rolling 90-day basis from 
2000~2016 as a proxy for credit defaults.   
Figure 9.3: Standard Deviation of High-Yield Option 

 
The results in Figure 9.3 shows that based on using the standard deviation as an 
indicator of a tipping point being reached, a tipping point on credit risk did occur in 
2009 (i.e., well into the GFC), and this may explain the very heavy tail distributions 
occurring over the 2008~2014 period. The other attribute of a tipping point having been 
reached, namely the slowing down of recovery, has also been considered by the simple 
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method of counting the number of days for the High Yield Option spread to return to 
its previous low after increasing. The results are shown graphically in Figure 9.4, where 
for ease of analysis, periods of more than two days to recover are shown below. 
Figure 9.4: High-Yield Option Spread Days to Recover to Previous Low 

The results in Figure 9.4 clearly indicates that around the time of the GFC, there is a 
significant slowing down of recovery from previous levels. Based on various attributes, 
which demonstrate that a tipping point has occurred, there should be evidence of a 
power law distribution breaking down and a slowing down of recovery from variations. 
As such, it would seem that credit defaults reached a tipping point during the GFC. 
However, it should be noted that there is no universal agreement across academic 
disciplines as to how to detect a tipping point. Fernholz (2017) suggested that volatility 
in financial systems could be considered as consisting of a volatility component and a 
reversion component and therefore, implied the tipping point concept was not relevant. 
However, this may just be an alternative description of the tipping point mechanism 
rather than indicating tipping points do not exist in financial systems.  
 
Figure 9.5 shows the results of applying the early warning signals analysis of Guttal, 
Raghavendra, Goel and Hoarau (2016) for credit defaults. Variance, autocorrelation at 
lag-1 and mean power spectrum are used as an indicator of the early warning signals, 
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and Kendall’s τ is used to show the trend of these indicators. The power spectrum 
describes the strength of the wave at different frequencies, i.e., at which frequency the 
signal is strong or weak. An increase in the power spectrum’s low frequency indicates 
a power increase embedded in variance; hence, it can be a signal of critical transition 
(Kleinen, Held & Petschel-Held 2003). The autocorrelation at lag 1, as an important 
indicator of an early warning signal (Dakos, Scheffer, van Nes, Brovkin, Petoukhov & 
Held 2008; Scheffer et al. 2009), does not present a clear trend prior to the GFC. 
Nonetheless, the variance and mean power spectrum at low frequency increases 
dramatically before the GFC. Kendall’s τ  of autocorrelation at lag 1 shows a 
distribution from −1 to 1, indicating no clear trend of autocorrelation, while Kendall’s 
τ of variance and mean power spectrum are close to 1, indicating a clear increasing 
trend. 
Figure 9.5: Early Warning Signals of the GFC Based on High-Yield Option 

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9.4: Implications 
It has been discussed in academia that statistics of events in many CAS’s share a similar 
attribute, namely that the distribution of sizes are often observed as power law 
distribution (Carlson & Doyle 2002). Some believe it has a strong connection with the 
system’s state. Carlson and Doyle (2002) proposed that the tipping point that was 
generated from the mechanism of a system’s self-organisation, and power law would 
be one signature of an internal self-sustaining critical state. However, in some other 
examples of CAS, it did not appear and the relationship between a power law and a 
tipping point is not proved in many empirical analysis (Goldstein, Morris & Yen 2004). 
The analysis shows that loss in a credit default did not strictly obey a power law 
distribution and its distribution is even heavier than power law. The results in this thesis 
indicate that there is no correlation between a power law and a tipping point, however, 
the heavy tail distribution reflects the outcome of the system that is characterised by 
self-organisation, emerging from many internal interactions. Furthermore, credit risk 
reached a tipping point during the GFC in the analysis, and it also indicates that static 
methods of assessing credit risk will fail over long-time periods. The critical phase of 
a system, such as the tipping point, will influence characteristics of risk events 
dramatically, and underling drivers of risk defaults also change significantly, along with 
the system.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion and Further Research 
Credit risk indicates the potential loss that corporations or individuals will encounter 
when failing to pay their financial obligations. This issue has become one of the major 
risks for banks and other financial institutions. There are two major categories of the 
credit risk model. One of them uses factors from a company’s financial structure, called 
the Structural Model. The other uses factors from the market, called the Reduced-Form 
Model. This thesis introduced the classical models under two categories in Chapter 2 
and listed literatures that analyse credit default risk at both the corporate and individual 
levels. In summary, the factors that are used to model credit risk can be grouped into 
macro variables and micro variables. However, the models in current literature are 
mostly static. They use factors either from micro variables or macro variables. Thus, 
there are few papers that can give a comprehensive approach to assess credit default 
risk with both macro and micro variables considered. 
 
The default events are very complex, no matter if it is at the corporate level or the 
individual level. The underlying drivers of default events can change and evolve with 
the macroeconomic system. The reason behind this is that the default events happening 
in the economic system is a typical example of CAS. Chapter 3 introduced the CAS 
and its characteristics, and it is formed by a large number of individual system agents 
and their localised interactions. The system can self-organise itself to adapt the change 
from the environment and has co-evolved between its sub-systems. The economic 
system is full of interacting individual components (firms, institutions, regulators), and 
its structure is self-organising under the constraint of regulations. Co-evolution happens 
internally between sub-systems, such as the financial sector, real sector, technology, 
environment, government policy and so on. Therefore, Chapter 3 justifies that the 
economic system is a typical example of CAS. 
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Given that the economic system is a CAS, credit default cannot be studied by linear and 
static models. Chapter 4 introduced a method called Cladistics Analysis, which was 
initially inspired from biological taxonomy. It is a classification method that organises 
species in terms of their common ancestors and characteristics. The algorithm of 
classification is general and can be used in other fields outside biology. The chapter 
lists some examples in the literature that apply Cladistics Analysis to social science, 
especially in financial risk management. It turns out that this kind of analysis is able to 
organise a large number of risk events in terms of their characteristics. It produces a 
treelike diagram, called a cladogram. The cladogram can reveal the relationship 
between characteristics of risk events and the evolving pattern of risk events  
 
This thesis used two datasets of credit default at both the corporate and individual levels 
to validate the methodology. The data was provided by Moody’s database and the 
Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA). The basic process was to analyse 
credit default events and extract the characteristics of each event. The results show a 
stable and significant pattern of systemic Level 1 characteristics of default events. 
Specifically, results of the three economic zones showed similar Level 1 characteristics 
of corporate default events; however, the characteristics are not identical. Chapter 6 
explains both the common and different parts of default drivers and the possible reasons 
behind the differences across each economic zone. Furthermore, Chapter 6 categorises 
major default characteristics into controllable factors by the companies and 
uncontrollable factors, such as the macroeconomy and regulations. It turns out that 
characteristics of credit defaults in the United States are more controllable by the 
companies than defaults in the EU and Asia. Moreover, Asian companies’ defaults are 
significantly affected by external factors that are uncontrollable by a company. The 
implication of these results is that credit assessments should take into account both 
internal and external factors, especially for companies outside the United States. 
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As the data for the United States is much greater than the other two economic zones, it 
allowed an extensive analysis on the period between 1990–2010. To explore how credit 
default characteristics may have changed over time, a cumulative time period analysis 
was undertaken. The results showed a stable and consistent pattern of default 
characteristics for 1990–2010. Controllable characteristics, such as ‘Weak Revenue’ 
and ‘High Leverage,’ appeared throughout the whole period. ‘Cash Flow Issue,’ ‘Weak 
Industry’ and ‘External Events’ lasted only a short time. ‘Failed Strategy’ is also 
prominent but not consistent, especially after 2000. Besides the major Level 1 
characteristics, analysis on the lower levels was done in Chapter 7. The characteristic, 
‘Weak Industry,’ was observed as an emerging factor. It stayed on the lower level until 
1995 and emerged to a systemic factor on Level 1, dominating between 1995–1999. 
Other lower-level factors, such as ‘Weak Economy,’ stayed active but did not emerge 
to Level 1. The results imply that systemic characteristics such as those on Level 1 are 
very important to study because they dominate most of the default events. Moreover, 
those un-systemic characteristics at the lower level are also worth monitoring, as they 
have the ability to emerge to the higher level. 
 
Chapter 8 applied Cladistics Analysis to bankruptcy of an individual person. Results of 
Level 1 characteristics show stability as well. ‘Age,’ ‘Gross Income,’ ‘Spouse Income,’ 
‘No Real Property Assets’ and ‘Live in Major City’ dominate risk events consistently. 
This suggests that bankruptcies occur predominately within the pre-retirement 
population and are driven by socioeconomic issues, rather than characteristics 
controllable by the individual. Several characteristics that may emerge are also pointed 
out because their related events have a high proportion of total events but do not show 
up in Level 1. Furthermore, Chapter 8 also embedded three macroeconomic factors in 
the analysis. The results indicated that ‘Change in Interest Rate’ and ‘Change in 
Unemployment Rate’ are very significant in the results of the Level 1 cladogram, which 
means they have a large influence on personal bankruptcy. 
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Power law and tipping points have been discussed in complex system studies for 
decades. Most of the research are done in the scientific fields. Chapter 9 tested power 
law and detected the possible tipping point in the field of credit risk. Chapter 9 used the 
methodology from the Clauset et al. (2009) paper. The results indicated that credit 
default losses did not follow a power law strictly, and its true distribution is much 
heavier than power law distribution. This implies that the power law phenomenon does 
exist in many CAS’s, but it is not an inevitable characteristic of a CAS. Further analysis 
has detected a tipping point existed during the GFC in 2008. The dynamic change 
during the tipping point period indicates that the static approach of assessing credit risk 
will not work. Underlying drivers of risk events are different under different phases of 
the economic system.  
 
In summary, this research saw the complexity of credit default events, and the 
underlying drivers exhibit dynamic evolvement. Most traditional models are linear and 
static based, which cannot explain the dynamic behaviour of credit risk defaults. 
Moreover, different countries and different phases of the economy also affect the major 
drivers of risk events. This research identified this shortcoming of the methods of 
current credit risk assessment and then addressed this issue by introducing a 
methodology specially constructed for the analysis of dynamic systems. This thesis is 
based on the assumption that the environment (the economic system) of credit risk 
events is a typical example of a CAS, and then uses a system-based method called 
Cladistics Analysis to explore the underlying characteristics of credit risk events at both 
the corporate level and the individual level. The results show strong stability and reveal 
that the factors affecting credit risk can come both from macro and micro factors.  
 
The novel approach and significant results gives a new insight into credit risk 
management and provides a new direction of system-based research in the future. It 
will be very interesting to develop a new credit risk model that allows the use of a 
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flexible variable data set. In the future, the model will not use a static variable set, but 
it can be adjusted in terms of type of default entity, country or geographical area, 
economic conditions and even unexpected events. Such a new assessment of credit risk 
should be embedded with multiple complex-system-based methods, such as cladistics 
analysis, and gives a very comprehensive analysis based on a large number of datasets. 
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Appendix E, Tree for Three Economic Zones 
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Appendix F, Trees for Cumulative Years in US Market 
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Appendix G, ASFA Data Description 
Field Description 
Anonymous ID Identifier used for AFSA purposes.  
Administration Group All records in this file are Bankruptcies.  
There are 3 types of formal personal insolvencies: bankruptcy, debt 
agreement or personal insolvency agreement. 
Administration Type Type of bankruptcy: 
• Debtors petition (voluntary bankruptcy) 
• Sequestration order (a creditor makes someone who owes them 
money bankrupt through a court process)  
Gender The gender/sex of the debtor. Values are Male, Female or Not Stated.  
FY of Bankruptcy The financial year that the bankrupt entered into bankruptcy. This file 
contains  data from 2007-08 to 2015-16.  
Age At Insolvency Age (in years) of bankrupt on the date that they became bankrupt. To protect 
privacy, grouped values are provided rather than individual ages e.g. 40-44.  
Family Situation Family situation at the time of entering bankruptcy: 
• couple with/out dependants 
• single with/out dependants. 
 
Note: dependants can include spouse, children, parents, invalid relative.  
Primary Cause of 
Bankruptcy 
Bankrupts select the main cause of their personal insolvency from a range of 
options on the statement of affairs. These causes are organised into business 
related and non-business related categories. bankrupts’ responses are used to 
this question to determine whether a personal insolvency is business related. 
 
A bankrupt’s personal insolvency is business related when it is because of 
his or her proprietary interest in a business. The statement of affairs does not 
provide explanations about the range of options, nor this definition of 
“business related”. 
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If bankrupts have different interpretations of what constitutes a business and 
whether their involvement in a business was the main cause of their 
insolvency, this may affect our statistics. 
Business Related 
Bankruptcy 
Values are Yes, No or Not Stated. Please see the Primary Cause of 
Bankruptcy field for further information.   
Source of Bankruptcy 
Information 
Main source of information about bankruptcy and the alternatives. Bankrupts 
select one option from a list in the statement of affairs.   
Previously Bankrupt Values are Yes or No. Indicates whether this person has been bankrupt 
before.  
Occupation Description The statement of affairs provides a free text box for debtors to nominate 
their usual trade or profession. We classify these responses using the 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ANZSCO).  
 
We don’t ask debtors for details of the skills or tasks associated with their 
occupation. As a result, we may be inconsistent when we code occupations. 
For example, if a debtor states that they are a property developer, we may 
classify this occupation in sales representatives and agents (property 
manager) or education professionals (land economist or valuer).  
 
This field shows the ANZSCO text description of the occupation. We also 
use the following AFSA descriptions for occupations that are not in 
ANZSCO: 
• Student 
• Invalid pensioner 
• Other pensioner 
• Housewife / househusband 
• Retired 
• Unemployed 
• Not stated 
• Uncodable 
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Occupation Code This field shows the ANZSCO code of the bankrupt’s usual occupation at 
the time of their bankruptcy.  We also use the following AFSA codes for 
occupations that are not in ANZSCO: 
• -3 (Not Stated) 
• 9999 (Student, invalid pensioner, other pensioner, housewife / 
househusband, retired, unemployed, not stated, uncodable).  
Primary Income Source The source of income that accounted for the highest proportion of the 
bankrupt’s gross income over the previous 12 months.  
Gross Income Gross income of the bankrupt over the previous 12 months. To protect 
privacy, we provide this in grouped values rather than individual incomes 
e.g. $15000.00-$19999.99 
Spouse Income Separate gross income of spouse/partner. The statement of affairs gives the 
option of providing spouse/partner income over different time periods 
including annual and weekly. Accordingly, this field needs to be analysed in 
conjunction with the Spouse Income Frequency field. To protect privacy, we 
provide this in grouped values rather than individual incomes e.g. 
$85000.00-$89999.99 
Spouse Income 
Frequency 
The statement of affairs gives the option of providing spouse/partner income 
over different time periods including annual and weekly. Values are: 
• Fortnight 
• Hour  
• Month 
• Monthly 
• Week 
• Year 
• Yearly 
• Ad hoc 
• Notdis (Note: this means not disclosed) 
• N/A  
State State of residence at the time that the bankrupt entered into bankruptcy. OT 
refers to Other.  
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Remoteness Area We have concorded the residence of the bankrupt to the Australian 
Statistical Geography Standard Remoteness Structure from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/home/remoteness+structure 
This field provides the text name of the remoteness area. 
Remoteness Code This field provides the remoteness code from the ASGS Remoteness 
Structure. Please see Remoteness Area for further information. 
Total Liabilities Generally, liabilities (debts) are unsecured debts. To protect privacy, 
grouped values are provided rather than individual liabilities e.g. $45000.00-
$49999.99. 
Total liabilities is comprised of the following fields: 
• Liab: Chattel Mortgage (Consumer) 
• Liab: Child Support Agency 
• Liab: Other 
• Liab: Sub Prime Lenders 
• Liab: Tax 
• Liab: Business Security 
• Liab: Overdrawn Accounts 
• Liab: Pawn shops/Payday Advance 
• Liab: Utilities 
• Liab: Bill of Sale 
• Liab: House Mortgage (please note that mortgages relate to any 
residential property other than time share arrangements) 
• Liab: Internet 
• Liab: Phone 
• Liab: Rates 
• Liab: Store Card 
• Liab: Trade Creditor 
• Liab: Cable/Satellite TV 
• Liab: Credit Card 
• Liab: Hire purchase 
• Liab: Lease 
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• Liab: Legal (this refers to legal fees) 
• Liab: Medical 
• Liab: Personal Loan. 
Total Assets To protect privacy, grouped values are provided rather than individual asset 
amounts e.g. $5000.00-$9999.99. 
Total assets are comprised of the following fields: 
• Asset: interest in partnership 
• Asset: jewellery 
• Asset: money owed to the bankrupt 
• Asset: tax refund 
• Asset: other items of value 
• Asset: sale, transfer or gift of assets in the last 5 years 
• Asset: shares 
• Asset: tools of trade 
• Asset: business assets/equipment/stock 
• Asset: crops 
• Asset: funds in bank account 
• Asset: investment 
• Asset: licences 
• Asset: superannuation and life insurance policies 
• Asset: cash 
• Asset: collectables and antiques 
• Asset: fixtures and fittings 
• Asset: livestock/crops 
• Asset: livestock 
• Asset: marine vessel 
• Asset: plant and equipment 
• Asset: real property 
• Asset: stock 
• Asset: timeshare 
• Asset: undervalued transactions (s120) 
• Asset: vehicle. 
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Appendix H, Summary of Characteristics on Each Level in terms of Number of Related Risk Events for Period 2008-
2016 
Year 2008 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 Level 10 
Gender 30 126 210 115 149 88 22 3 1 0 
Age < 65 291 444 219 108 60 14 1 0 0 0 
Single 56 34 81 161 78 22 25 4 2 0 
With Dependants 11 107 112 108 107 78 36 11 2 1 
Business Related Bankruptcy 0 207 35 56 36 26 14 7 0 0 
Previously Bankrupt 119 44 17 28 31 28 10 4 2 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 30 78 117 133 121 100 45 13 3 0 
Gross Income <$60000 238 250 307 149 65 40 14 3 1 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 218 176 263 75 70 13 2 0 0 0 
Credit Card Liability 39 213 170 173 143 75 27 2 0 0 
Personal Loan 7 76 85 125 116 86 35 3 1 0 
No Funds in Bank 0 8 164 102 115 47 17 7 0 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 1018 136 42 20 12 4 1 0 0 0 
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No Real Property Asset 61 263 242 183 124 44 20 2 0 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 41 281 287 135 77 56 12 4 0 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 158 133 202 219 167 92 35 9 2 0 
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Year 2009 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 
Gender 27 161 138 205 160 103 30 11 1 
Age < 65 686 316 167 57 45 19 4 1 0 
Single 204 57 95 77 56 30 29 2 1 
With Dependants 23 130 143 147 137 62 24 6 2 
Business Related Bankruptcy 120 76 25 57 42 32 19 2 0 
Previously Bankrupt 65 63 28 54 40 40 12 6 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 20 149 171 206 100 75 13 3 0 
Gross Income <$60000 264 319 296 170 110 39 5 0 1 
Spouse Income < $10000 294 262 207 126 96 48 13 1 0 
Credit Card Liability 108 218 233 215 146 48 19 2 0 
Personal Loan 0 140 121 133 88 74 29 6 0 
No Funds in Bank 100 108 45 88 74 29 13 9 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 284 286 354 135 69 41 12 4 1 
No Real Property Asset 108 216 285 242 129 59 17 3 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 52 222 270 237 112 76 27 5 1 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 77 306 277 280 152 66 18 4 0 
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Year 2010 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 
Gender 63 151 260 231 185 66 26 2 0 
Age < 65 740 394 217 85 52 21 8 4 0 
Single 23 88 185 147 154 45 25 4 0 
With Dependants 25 162 188 156 137 66 35 7 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 171 38 42 104 85 36 6 6 0 
Previously Bankrupt 152 0 38 71 49 47 18 3 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 31 188 212 171 96 79 33 6 2 
Gross Income <$60000 269 516 233 220 76 55 25 4 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 355 492 189 132 52 18 2 0 0 
Credit Card Liability 156 168 340 254 118 77 17 3 0 
Personal Loan 76 127 160 138 109 74 29 7 1 
No Funds in Bank 154 34 77 85 55 41 25 8 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 60 159 209 182 120 79 36 18 1 
No Real Property Asset 122 274 361 233 153 66 23 6 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 100 282 357 197 126 74 23 6 1 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 120 353 341 270 147 70 15 4 1 
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Year 2011 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 Level 10 
Gender 77 202 246 184 154 48 12 0 0 0 
Age < 65 846 298 187 81 33 11 4 0 0 0 
Single 46 113 239 123 75 38 11 4 1 0 
With Dependants 66 128 152 175 113 39 25 13 2 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 32 147 133 97 62 28 11 2 2 0 
Previously Bankrupt 26 124 49 70 42 18 14 7 0 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 57 125 240 182 106 61 17 4 6 0 
Gross Income <$60000 526 287 222 150 78 47 17 2 3 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 457 421 158 86 28 11 1 0 0 0 
Credit Card Liability 216 260 292 191 95 34 18 4 1 1 
Personal Loan 77 202 151 83 63 42 13 1 0 0 
No Funds in Bank 186 20 52 54 69 22 7 6 0 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 101 77 243 211 103 48 10 3 0 1 
No Real Property Asset 119 369 337 231 97 29 12 1 0 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 171 344 298 193 82 34 20 10 0 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 181 426 329 206 108 30 13 7 1 0 
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Year 2012 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 
Gender 34 201 230 261 110 78 20 8 0 
Age < 65 604 432 303 102 69 15 4 1 0 
Single 48 128 195 123 80 47 12 1 0 
With Dependants 86 173 207 163 107 48 10 2 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 67 174 111 77 74 33 16 1 0 
Previously Bankrupt 161 56 18 47 35 31 3 1 1 
Primary Income (From Salary) 12 176 257 178 151 53 22 6 0 
Gross Income <$60000 266 492 268 195 104 30 6 2 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 476 439 139 71 31 25 5 3 0 
Credit Card Liability 127 237 271 283 132 71 18 6 0 
Personal Loan 1 109 194 159 105 49 22 1 0 
No Funds in Bank 209 20 23 89 51 35 11 1 1 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 8 208 203 194 125 54 16 6 0 
No Real Property Asset 125 308 267 277 140 50 25 10 1 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 224 283 325 215 99 55 17 6 1 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 358 300 338 232 109 32 7 1 0 
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Year 2013 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 
Gender 152 182 244 173 142 62 13 8 2 
Age < 65 823 319 206 84 31 20 12 1 0 
Single 20 89 233 162 89 48 16 4 0 
With Dependants 54 204 181 133 104 58 25 3 1 
Business Related Bankruptcy 96 84 104 165 64 22 21 7 2 
Previously Bankrupt 207 9 13 43 22 26 20 4 1 
Primary Income (From Salary) 62 294 149 174 88 48 20 11 0 
Gross Income <$60000 327 416 264 160 89 67 15 3 3 
Spouse Income < $10000 581 297 143 95 34 10 8 0 0 
Credit Card Liability 73 305 293 230 135 67 24 7 1 
Personal Loan 58 129 133 152 82 67 27 10 3 
No Funds in Bank 109 69 42 63 65 37 6 4 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 93 75 218 148 99 63 34 6 3 
No Real Property Asset 116 505 221 184 102 57 11 4 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 85 338 303 219 124 96 21 11 4 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 172 450 306 231 92 61 13 1 0 
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Year 2014 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 
Gender 131 173 249 190 110 74 34 8 0 
Age < 65 587 306 345 110 48 22 10 2 0 
Single 15 110 194 137 125 40 12 3 0 
With Dependants 57 157 179 133 105 59 16 5 1 
Business Related Bankruptcy 163 58 97 76 42 41 15 4 0 
Previously Bankrupt 149 0 67 43 53 25 7 2 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 94 218 158 160 112 51 20 13 1 
Gross Income <$60000 300 349 258 196 78 34 17 3 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 358 452 168 84 48 18 3 0 0 
Credit Card Liability 240 229 203 193 121 38 21 4 0 
Personal Loan 31 120 140 164 88 75 30 3 1 
No Funds in Bank 156 31 41 41 60 25 12 3 1 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 53 147 144 154 125 49 20 6 1 
No Real Property Asset 197 240 347 216 109 66 20 6 1 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 184 287 302 208 127 31 4 2 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 234 271 281 263 152 64 23 8 0 
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Year 2015 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 
Gender 59 186 242 218 145 59 19 4 0 
Age < 65 912 255 133 81 39 9 4 1 0 
Single 88 157 185 87 83 43 12 0 0 
With Dependants 153 107 132 138 96 47 20 6 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 26 164 69 109 89 37 6 0 0 
Previously Bankrupt 115 27 58 46 51 34 14 3 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 160 151 184 136 94 48 15 2 2 
Gross Income <$60000 285 460 276 104 51 26 10 3 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 516 274 147 62 83 20 5 2 0 
Credit Card Liability 130 191 310 194 123 42 17 4 0 
Personal Loan 63 150 127 124 96 44 19 6 1 
No Funds in Bank 67 18 85 102 50 31 8 4 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 123 98 145 143 103 34 16 3 0 
No Real Property Asset 218 291 353 220 90 27 12 3 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 119 294 359 221 99 39 6 0 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 139 381 331 208 121 42 15 2 0 
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Year 2016 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 Level 10 
Gender 150 168 234 137 122 50 21 9 0 0 
Age < 65 852 287 83 78 41 25 6 0 0 0 
Single 11 119 206 127 103 34 14 1 0 0 
With Dependants 33 145 182 142 111 40 17 3 0 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 127 95 87 94 51 34 14 1 0 0 
Previously Bankrupt 62 45 54 77 45 38 13 0 2 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 13 263 201 137 112 38 29 5 0 0 
Gross Income <$60000 336 388 185 110 79 24 7 0 0 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 516 192 118 116 68 26 13 4 1 0 
Credit Card Liability 81 258 218 170 124 74 27 6 0 0 
Personal Loan 16 107 148 128 110 50 20 7 0 0 
No Funds in Bank 57 0 89 60 50 41 14 2 0 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 136 98 137 112 49 57 19 2 0 1 
No Real Property Asset 154 330 285 232 118 46 15 1 0 0 
Vehicle Asset <$10000 70 406 278 141 117 54 17 3 0 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 84 322 353 201 188 48 16 4 1 0 
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Appendix I, Summary of Characteristics on Each Level in terms of Number of Related Risk Events for Whole Period 
with Macro-Factors 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 Level 10 Level 11 Level 12 
Gender 433 813 1468 1605 1080 663 292 102 30 3 2 0 
Age < 65 3457 2913 1794 854 529 245 118 19 11 3 0 0 
Single 394 983 961 649 627 314 176 64 10 5 1 0 
With Dependants 306 816 1023 943 863 571 352 132 59 10 0 0 
Business Related Bankruptcy 488 958 577 495 526 329 189 124 16 0 0 0 
Previously Bankrupt 1177 153 164 322 335 180 160 49 11 7 1 0 
Primary Income (From Salary) 267 676 1265 1216 1051 663 339 147 34 9 4 1 
Gross Income <$60000 1659 2115 1783 1512 975 420 194 48 20 5 0 0 
Spouse Income < $10000 2186 2158 1540 838 557 258 123 23 6 3 0 0 
Credit Card Liability 497 1291 1507 1630 1273 624 304 143 30 6 1 0 
Personal Loan 306 519 746 1040 789 618 275 106 43 5 1 0 
No Funds in Bank 706 502 551 457 355 258 148 62 16 4 0 0 
Superannuation & Insurance< $5000 329 977 1373 1339 950 613 329 108 33 6 1 0 
No Real Property Asset 463 1573 2071 1636 1163 666 281 72 22 2 0 0 
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Vehicle Asset <$10000 420 1593 1691 1675 1185 673 269 122 36 8 1 0 
Major City and Inner AUS Area 580 1906 2280 1777 1160 539 276 102 36 2 0 0 
GDP Change 88 777 1082 938 772 483 251 80 26 3 0 0 
Lending Rate Change 1849 378 267 146 93 58 8 4 0 0 0 0 
Unemployment Rate Change 1976 2155 1165 630 387 138 59 14 1 0 0 0 
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